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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the end of the global Cold War has
provided North and South Korea with a greater opportunity to
end the country's division. Through an assessment of North
and South Korean reunification policies, this analysis
suggests that ideological differences in policy content should
be seen as a reflection of the ideological systems of their
respective benefactors (Soviet Union and United States) . The
implementation of Gorbachev's Glasnost and Roh's Nordpolitik
substantially reduced the barriers between East and West but
left an increasingly isolated, and potentially dangerous,
North Korea
.
This thesis contends that instability on the Korean
peninsula threatens regional stability, a condition inclining
both Koreas to take a more realistic approach to the issue of
reunification. It is therefore in the best interest of the
United States to take a more active role in reducing tensions
on the peninsula, in order to influence a reunification
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Korea's political division is the core of its prominence
in world affairs as one of the last remnants of a larger
political conflict. After more than a generation of
subjugation under the repressive Japanese empire, the Korean
nation emerged in the late 1940s as two countries with opposed
doctrines, both of which developed along the ideological lines
of their conflicting Cold War benefactors. As long as the
existence of two rival Koreas continues, the peninsula will
continue to serve as a symbol of lingering global Cold War
tensions.
The collapse of the Soviet Union has, for the most part,
ended the five decades long Cold War waged between the forces
of democracy and the forces of communism. A new world has
emerged wherein bipolar alignment is no longer necessary and
nations are free to pursue their own destinies unhampered by
the ideologies of their benefactors. The result of this
freedom is often violent expressions of nationalism, however,
it remains the demonstration of a people's choice to create
nations based on common ethnic and cultural ties.
Unfortunately, similar expressions are denied to the divided
people of the Korean peninsula who continue to suffer the
effects of the Cold War conflict.
The political division of the Korean peninsula contradicts
the nature of the unified nation that existed for nearly 13
centuries prior to 1945. At the time of Korea's unification
in 668 under the Silla rulers, the essential characteristics
of nationhood - political unity, common language, ethnic
homogeneity, well-recognized international boundaries - were
already in place. 1 Korea's cultural development paralleled
that of China, primarily due to Silla' s close ties to the
T'ang dynasty rulers. While these close ties ensured a degree
of security for Korea, they also committed Korea to a
relatively minor role in the shaping of events in the region.
Korea's importance to its powerful neighbors - China,
Russia, and Japan - is due to the strategic geopolitical
location of the Korean peninsula. In the thirteenth and
sixteenth centuries, Korea served as the invasion route
between China and Japan. A rebellion within Korea led to the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and an attempt by the two
powers to gain hegemony in the peninsula. Similarly, the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the result of competition
over Korea and brought further destruction to an already
weakened country. Russian and Japanese troops fought again
during the final days of World War II in the northern part of
Korea. Finally, between 1950 and 1953 nineteen nations
participated in the Korean War which resulted in the political
division that exists today. 2
The reunification of the peninsula remains an important
priority for all Koreans, both to the leaders of the North:
The Korean people do not want to remain split and nothing
can break the desire and will of the Korean people for the
reunification of their country. 3
and the leaders of the South:
Nothing is more culturally important than the past and the
unity of 13 centuries. For Koreans, the past unlocks the
future . 4
The 13 December 1991 signing of a treaty of reconciliation
and nonaggression by the leaders of North and South Korea has
raised hopes that peaceful reunification of the two Koreas is
possible. Changes in US policy, such as the reduction of US
forces in South Korea 5 and the withdrawal of US nuclear
weapons," have been implemented in an attempt to further
reduce tensions and contribute to an environment more
conducive to peaceful negotiations. However, the range of
reunification scenarios stretches from the nightmare of
dangerous nationalistic expansion and nuclear conflict to the
dream of peaceful reunification and stability. 7
The core argument of this thesis is that it is in the best
interest of the United States to work toward reducing tensions
with both Koreas in order to have input in the reunification
process and to influence an outcome most favorable to US
interests in the region. This thesis will examine the
division of Korea and the evolution of reunification policy
throughout the various administrations of the Korean
government. This examination will lay the groundwork for a
assessment of the particular issues (political, military,
economic) involved in an actual reunification attempt as well
as the reunification options available. Finally, the specific
role of, and effects on, the United States will be reviewed in
an attempt to determine how the reunification of Korea can be
best used to the benefit of the United States.
1. Bruce Cumings, The Two Koreas: On the Road to Unification
(New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1990), 7.
2
.
Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and
South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984),
1-2
.
3 . II Sung Kim, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of
Korea (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 37.
4. Dae Jung Kim, "The Once and Future Korea," Foreign Policy
86 (Spring 1992) : 44
.
5. Department of Defense, Report to Congress, A Strategic
Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st
Centurv (28 February 1991) , (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1991), 4.
6. James Sterngold, "Seoul Says it Now has No Nuclear Arms,"
New York Times , 19 December 1991, p. 3.
7 Dae Jung Kim, 44
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II. THE DIVISION OF KOREA
A. JAPANESE OCCUPATION
Korea's political separation was the result not of a
single event but a series of events that began in the
sixteenth century and culminated in the current division. In
1592, Japan's Hideyoshi Toyotomi , in pursuit of new worlds to
conquer, embarked upon a plan to invade China by using the
Korean peninsula as his invasion route. When Korea refused to
join him in his attempt or to give him free passage, Hideyoshi
sent a force of 160,000 men against it. China eventually
responded to this attack on its tributary state but not until
after Japanese forces had spread out over nearly the entire
country. The ensuing battles and negotiations continued until
1598 when the Japanese finally withdrew from the peninsula. 1
During those six years, great cultural treasures and
monuments were destroyed, the central government was weakened,
agricultural production declined, and the tax system was
totally disrupted. Korea remained mired in broken-down
political and social institutions, while its leadership, in
the esteemed Confucian tradition, continued to look backward
to the political and social models of Chinese antiquity. In
1606, Japan's Tokugawa family restored friendly relations with
Korea but the Yi dynasty was never able to fully recover from
the invasions that had totally disrupted its society and
government
.
In 1868, the Meiji restoration began a period of
modernization and political change for Japan. The new
government in Tokyo attempted to renegotiate treaties made
with Korea in 1606, but Korea rebuffed these attempts and
refused to even recognize the new government. Nevertheless,
although Japan's political position in Korea was weak, its
economic position steadily grew until by 1894, 90% of Korea's
foreign trade was with Japan. The importance of the economic
relationship, as well as Japan's growing concern over Russia
and China, contributed to the Japanese belief that Korea must
be independent of China's influence or even controlled by
Japan if the Japanese empire were to remain secure.
Consequently, Japan continued to make efforts to open up Korea
for trade purposes as well as to assist in reforming and
modernizing Korea for its own purposes."
Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)
forced China to recognize Korean independence, and to give up
its claim of suzerainty over Korea. In 1904, Russia advanced
into Manchuria in a quest for ice-free ports with the control
of Korea as one of its specific objectives. Japan was
victorious in the ensuing Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and
Russia, under the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth, was
forced to recognize the political, military, and economic
interests of Japan in Korea.
In 1905, after the defeat of Russia, Ito Hirobumi, backed
by Japanese troops, secured a convention making Korea a
Japanese protectorate. Even though Korea's new status was
recognized internationally, the Korean emperor persisted in
the belief that the United States would come to his country's
rescue because of the "good offices" clause in the Korean-
American treaty of 1882. US officials, however, felt Korea
had no grounds to call on the "good offices" clause because of
the Japanese-Korean agreements which had turned Korea into a
Japanese protectorate.'
Ito, as the resident-general, initially planned a
benevolent and modernizing administration. This was intended
to win Korean collaboration and good will while making Japan's
dominance secure. However, in 1907, the Korean emperor sent
a secret delegation to the Hague Peace Conference to make the
powers aware of the violation of Korean rights by the
Japanese. None of the world powers were interested enough to
contest Japan's claims and the Korean delegation was turned
away without being heard. When the Japanese became aware of
this venture, the Korean emperor was forced to abdicate his
throne to his more malleable son with whom a new agreement was
arranged giving the Japanese resident-general regent-like
powers. This agreement also allowed for all matters of
internal administration and foreign relations to be controlled
by the resident-general. In his new role as "regent," Ito
arranged for Japanese to serve as officials in the Korean
government and disbanded the Korean army. 4
On 26 October 1909, Ito was assassinated by a Korean
nationalist. While Ito's death had no serious effect on
Japanese public opinion or government policy, many in Korea
feared the Japanese government's reaction. In an effort to
preempt retaliatory action, the Ilchinhoe , a pro-Japanese
organization, submitted a memorial to the Korean throne and a
petition to the resident-general proposing Korea's absorption
by Japan
.
When news of this proposal reached the Korean people, they
responded with mass rallies in Seoul to protest the action.
However, the annexation had already been planned by the
Japanese government and the rallies only served as an
indicator of the Korean people's objection to the proposal.
To prevent any serious uprisings or violent actions, General
Terauchi Masatake, Japan's minister of war and resident-
general of Korea, ordered a complete transfer of police powers
from the Korean government and placed the police force under
direct command of the Japanese Army. An annexation treaty was
signed on 22 August 1910, and formally made public seven days
later. 5
Japanese authorities anticipated continued Korean
opposition to their rule and reasoned that a military
government would be the best way to deal with it . The
expansionist Japanese administration initiated many projects
in preparation for continued exploitation of the country.'
Japan's clashes with China over Manchuria led to even greater
changes within Korean society. The increasing military needs
of Japan led them to put additional demands on Korean
industry. Japan's war mobilization caused Korea's
transportation and communications to take on a military
character
.
Through the 1920s and 1930s, expanded efforts were made to
transform Koreans into Japanese subjects. Koreans were
prohibited from any communications indicating that Koreans
were different historically, culturally, or racially from the
Japanese. Korean children were taught Japanese history as
their own, forced to adopt Japanese-style names, and forced to
practice Shintoism. Beginning in October 1937, Korean
elementary school students were required every morning to
recite the "oath of imperial Japanese subjects":
We are subjects of the empire of Greater Japan. We unite
our hearts in striving to give loyalty and service to the
emperor. We will learn to endure hardships and be strong
upright citizens.
The use of the Korean language in the schools was forbidden,
and Korean newspapers were abolished.
By 1941, there were 60,000 Japanese civil and military
police in Korea, one for every 400 Korean citizens. As was
true of Japan itself, the system of power was highly
centralized and answerable to Tokyo. All important
administration positions went to the Japanese, and, with rare
exceptions, only clerical and minor positions were held by
Koreans. The development of a Korean political infrastructure
was suppressed. 8 The combined effect of this system resulted
in a helplessly unorganized population.
B. KOREAN NATIONALISM
After the end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson
proclaimed his doctrine of national self-determination which
appealed to and inspired many oppressed peoples throughout the
world, not the least of which were the Korean people. In
spite of the severe rule of the Japanese military
administration and suppression of resistance, opposition to
Japanese rule began to grow. A movement for independence
began outside the country, led by Koreans living abroad, and
eventually spread to the people in Korea.
In January 1919, Yi T'ae-wang, the former ruler of Korea
and a symbol of the Yi Dynasty, died amid rumors that he had
been poisoned by the Japanese. 4 Yi ' s death inspired the
independence movement to take some kind of action. A
Declaration of Independence was drawn up and signed by 32
leaders of the Protestant, Ch'ondogyo, and Buddhist religious
communities. 10 The proclamation was not aimed at initiating
violence of any type but stated only that Korea hoped to gain
independence with the help of the powerful nations of the
world and to appeal to those foreign nations' consciences.
The leaders of the independence movement believed that through
10
the good will of foreign nations independence could be
gained. n
The public announcement of the proclamation was made on
March 1, 1919. The leaders of the movement were arrested
immediately but a mass protest had already begun. The
Japanese interpreted the use of such a large mass
demonstration to be not just an expression of dissatisfaction
but as actual rebellion against their government. The
Japanese military police responded by firing upon the
demonstrators and requested additional support from the army
and navy. Throughout the nation people joined the movement
and took part in the mass parades. It is estimated that over
two million people were actively involved in 1,500
demonstrations. When order was reestablished, it was
determined that 7,509 people had been killed and 15,961
wounded. 715 private houses, 47 churches, and two school
buildings were destroyed by fire. 46,948 Koreans were
arrested, of whom 10,441 including 186 women, were tried and
convicted for their involvement in the demonstrations. 1 "
In spite of the popular support for the movement there was
no centralized organization to support it and the movement
resulted in, at best, an expression of dissatisfaction with
Japanese rule. The expected assistance from the great powers
of the world did not materialize. The Korean drive for
independence persisted in subsequent years but steadily
decreased in its momentum as a popular movement. Later the
11
exiled leaders of the movement gathered in Shanghai and
elected Syngman Rhee as president of the Provisional
Government of the Republic of Korea. 13
The March First movement failed in its attempt to gain
independence and provoked years of Japanese reprisals.
However, it generated a tremendous nationalistic feeling among
the Korean people and gave Korean nationalists their Bastille
Day. 14 The nationalist movement died down for a while but
then gradually emerged in a new form. The new movement was
different in that, instead of being simply a demonstration for
national independence, it developed into a movement associated
with socialism and class struggle. The new movement found its
main supporters among workers, farmers, students, and
intellectuals, and was characterized by labor disputes,
student organizations, ideological campaigns, and incidents
involving the Communist Party.
After the failure of the March First movement, some of the
Korean nationalists in Shanghai became dissatisfied with the
old movement and approached the Russian Communist Party. In
1920 they established a Korean Communist Party in Shanghai
which opposed Syngman Rhee ' s Provisional Government of the
Republic of Korea. 1 ' Large numbers of Koreans received
communist military and political training. The trend toward
socialist and communist thought spread among the younger
generation of Koreans and eventually became more powerful than
the nationalists. Student associations active in promoting
12
socialist and communist ideas were formed by Korean students
in Tokyo. Shanghai and Tokyo became the two main centers for
the ideological movements of Koreans. Revolutionary ideas
were introduced into Korea from these two centers until 1925
when the Korean Communist Party was established in Korea
itself. 16
While Korean political activities were continued outside
Korea by such groups as Rhee's Provisional Government and Kim
Ku's United Association of Movements for the Revival of Korea,
the Korean communist groups became active with the Chinese
communist groups in the armed contingents fighting against
Japan. The majority of Koreans living outside of Korea were
in Manchuria and, consequently, had numerous grievances of a
socio-economic nature against the Japanese as well as very
strong anti-Japanese feelings in general. Ties that had been
previously established with the Chinese communists made it
almost inevitable that Koreans would constitute an important
element of the guerilla forces and created an environment for
the emergence of Kim II Sung as the future leader of North
Korea
.
Although details of Kim's life are subject to controversy,
he is believed to have led the Northeast Anti-Japanese United
Army. This unit consisted of 150-300 men and was based on
support from Koreans in Manchuria. 17 In June 1937, Kim II
Sung reportedly led a successful raid against the Japanese on
the Sino-Korean border town of Pojon. Although the censored
13
press prevented reporting of other guerilla exploits, this
raid received considerable attention and encouraged
nationalistic feeling among Koreans everywhere. This type of
activity led to the creation of a folk hero image of Kim and
made the movement very popular to those Koreans unable to
carry on the fight themselves. 18
By February 1941, the advancing Japanese forced Kim to
retreat to Siberia where he came into contact with Soviet
leaders. This early contact allowed the Soviet command ample
time to listen to Kim's reports and evaluate him. The result
was the eventual selection of Kim II Sung by the Soviet
command to be the leader of North Korea.
With the defeat of the Japanese in 1945 came the collapse
of Korea's social, economic, and political machinery. The
Japanese had monopolized the higher level administration
positions and Korean overt political activity had been
completely suppressed. Consequently, the lack of organized
authority resulted in political chaos. To fill the void,
organizations of nearly every political ideology sprang up
throughout the country. The turmoil was tempered somewhat by
the common goals that were shared by these groups . They saw
the necessity to establish as quickly as possible a unified
political authority; to restore political, economic, social
and cultural institutions; and to build an independent nation
for the people. Consequently, the Korean people formed the
Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence and under
14
it the Korean People's Republic was born on 6 September
1945. 19
In spite of the initial show of unification, no unifying
political party or individual developed and the numerous
factions that had formed fought one another for power. When
Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, and other respected people returned to
Korea, the Korean public anticipated one of these men unifying
the factions. Instead their return deepened the rift between
the communists and the nationalists, and in February 1946, the
Korean People's Republic was dissolved.
Korea's internal conditions were not all that frustrated
the consolidation of the country. Korea was once again
occupied by foreign troops. Russia had declared war against
Japan on 8 August 1945, and crossed the frontier into northern
Korea. Approximately one month later, the United States sent
troops into southern Korea and announced the formation of a
military government . As the common enemies of the United
States and the Soviet Union disappeared, so too did the
alliance that had existed during the war. Soon the two
nations came into direct conflict over Korea.
C. US -USSR OCCUPATION
The Russian entry into northern Korea precluded a
surrender of the Japanese to the United States alone. The War-
Department planners who were preparing the draft for the
surrender of Japanese forces in Korea apparently were aware of
15
the close proximity of the Russians at the time of their
drafting and recommended the 38th parallel as the division
line for acceptance of Japanese troops. Ju
The division was more than just an administrative
convenience. US political objectives for a division at the
38th parallel were: to prevent occupation of all of Korea by
Soviet forces; to put the United States in as strong a
position as possible to implement the promise of a free Korea;
to provide for the security of Japan and US forces during the
US occupation of Japan; and to limit the area of communist
control.^ 1 When US forces entered Korea on 8 September 1945,
MacArthur assumed government powers in the South. In
response, the Soviets assumed control in the North.
Concerns about keeping Korea free from communist control
made US authorities hesitant to rely on any already
established political organizations. Occupation policy was
that the People's Republic of Korea was a front for Communist
activity and that Korean political development had to be
guided along lines consistent with American concepts of free
representative democracy.
During the early days of the occupation, Lieutenant
General John R. Hodges, the United States Commander, proposed
to begin the unification of the peninsula by relaxing travel
restrictions between the two zones and unifying Korea's
economy and administration. Colonel General Ivan Chistiakov,
Hodges' counterpart in the Soviet zone, chose not to respond
16
to these overtures. As a result, Hodges recommended that the
unification of Korea be considered at a higher level. The
matter was placed on the agenda of the Council of Foreign
Ministers meeting in Moscow in December. 2z
The Moscow Agreement of December 1945, accepted by China,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
established the following guidelines to assist in handling the
Korea situation:
1. With a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an
independent state, the creation of conditions for
developing the country on democratic principles and the
earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of
the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall
be set up a provisional Korean democratic government,
which shall take all the necessary steps for developing
the industry, transport, and agriculture of Korea and the
national culture of the Korean people.
2
.
In order to assist the formation of a provisional
Korean government and with a view to the preliminary
elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be
established a Joint Commission consisting of
representatives of the United States command in southern
Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In
preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult
with the Korean democratic parties and social
organizations. The recommendations worked out by the
Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the
Governments of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the
United Kingdom, and the United States prior to final
decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint
Commission
.
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the
participation of the provisional Korean democratic
government and of the Korean democratic organizations to
work out measures also for helping and assisting
(trusteeship) the political , economic, and social progress
of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-
government, and the establishment of the national
independence of Korea. 23
17
The Moscow Agreement was met with unfavorable reactions
from the Korean people in general and the nationalist groups
in particular. With the Japanese occupation still fresh in
their memories, most Koreans interpreted trusteeship to mean
a protectorate, with annexation as the final outcome. All
political groups, North and South, were in favor of immediate
independence and protested as such. Orders from North Korea,
however, instructed all loyal communists to support the
trusteeship and the communist and associated groups soon fell
into line with the official Soviet position.-' The
nationalist groups continued to resist the authority of the
occupation forces without restraint from the United States
authorities. As a result, by the time the Commission met,
communist and left-wing opposition to the trusteeship proposal
had been suppressed while the nationalist and conservative
groups remained openly resistant to the idea.
As the terms of the Moscow agreement were implemented, the
Soviet delegation insisted the only Korean groups and
organizations that should be consulted were those that were in
full accordance with the Moscow Agreement. The US delegation
argued that the groups expressing their opposition to
trusteeship were exercising the right of free speech and
should not be barred from consultation because of that. After
attempts at compromise were made and rejected, the US
delegation refused to accept the Soviet proposal and the
Commission was adjourned.
On 12 June 1946, the Joint Commission met again and issued
a communique outlining the agreed method of consultation.
Applications for participation in the consultations were
received from the various groups, and preliminary meetings of
the applicants were held. 39 political parties and 386 social
organizations applied in the American zone, claiming a total
membership of 52,000,000, submitted applications. In the
Soviet • zone, three political parties and 35 social
organizations, claiming 13,300,000 members, applied. The
number of applications submitted indicated a great deal of
overlapping membership and exaggeration. In the South, the
conservative parties and organizations claimed roughly
25,000,000 members, and the moderates and leftists about
13,500,000 each. In the Soviet zone, the only applicants
allowed were the members of communist-controlled Democratic
Front . 25
Early in July another disagreement developed over the
provisions for oral consultations. The Soviet delegation
objected to the involvement of any individuals or groups who
were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, formed in
December 1945 by conservative and nationalist party leaders to
block the work of the Joint Commission. Though the
Committee's membership represented the largest anti-Communist
group in South Korea, its opposition to the Moscow Agreement
was a source of embarrassment to the United States delegation
and an obstacle to agreement in the Joint Commission.
19
US-USSR relations deteriorated further when the Soviet
Consul in Seoul was expelled in retaliation for the Russian
refusal to permit establishment of an American consulate in
Pyongyang. This put an end to any serious effort by the
United States and the Soviet Union to solve the problem with
Korea and, along with the failure of the Joint Commission, led
to the realization that prolonged military government had
become inevitable . 2b
In August, the Soviet delegation proposed that the
Commission appoint a Korean provisional national assembly,
composed of representatives from consultative groups. A month
later, it proposed the withdrawal of American and Soviet
occupation forces by 1 January 1948, to allow the Korean
people to conduct their own elections. By this time, the
decayed state of US-USSR relations had led the Soviet Union to
attempt to stabilize the political, economic, and social
situations of North Korea to its own advantage, primarily by
eliminating the hostile groups from their respective zones.
The United States had responded in similar fashion and, as a
result, both Soviet proposals were rejected by the West.
The United States Military Government was unsuccessful in
satisfying any of the important groups or organizations in
Korea. The need to move troops quickly to Korea after the
Soviet entry resulted in almost no time for advanced planning
or preparation. Having little language capability, Occupation
forces inclined toward the landed gentry and conservatives who
20
made up the majority of English-speaking Koreans." 7 The
United States was also forced to lean politically toward the
nationalist and conservative organizations because of the
leftist groups' support of the People's Republic, believed to
be communist-controlled. However, these conservative elements
continued to be an embarrassment to the United States because
of their resistance to the Moscow Agreement, their opposition
to reform measures and democratic procedures, and their
demands for immediate and complete independence. 28
The difficulty the United States had in reaching some type
of agreement with the Soviet Union was exacerbated by the view
that Korea was of little strategic interest to the United
States. The Truman Doctrine focused US economic resources and
military strength in Europe, the area considered the most
threatened by the expansionist Soviet threat . Asia was
secondary to the European theater and the Chinese Communist
Party's victory was considered as simply a result of internal
Chinese forces that the United States had tried unsuccessfully
to influence. 29 When applied to Asia, the Truman Doctrine
resulted in a "selective policy of solidifying US political
and military presence in Japan, while undertaking gradual
military disengagement from the East Asian continent."
The National Security Council's assessment was that the
United States had "little strategic interest in maintaining
its present troops and bases in Korea." 31 President Harry
Truman endorsed this assessment as did General Douglas
21
MacArthur, who did not view Korea as important to the defense
of Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) considered South
Korea indefensible and thus a strategic liability for the
United States. 32
The advantages of maintaining US forces on the peninsula
were far outweighed by the liabilities. By 1947 the United
States was in the position of trying to withdraw from an
unfortunate circumstance without giving in to the pressures of
Communism. In an attempt to extricate themselves from their
predicament, US authorities brought the question before the
United Nations General Assembly. 33
D. UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION
On 17 October 1947, the United States sent a draft-
resolution to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The draft proposed the re-establishment of national
independence for Korea and the withdrawal of all occupying
forces as early as practically possible. To accomplish this
the occupying powers were to hold elections in their
respective zones by 31 March 1948 under the observation of a
United Nations Commission, after which a National Assembly and
a National Government would be created. The new government
would then establish its own security forces, and occupation
forces would be withdrawn in accordance with an agreement
between the National Government and the occupying powers.-"
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The Soviet delegation subsequently submitted two draft
resolutions. The first was a restatement of their original
proposal which recommended allowing the Korean people to
establish a government of their own choosing after the
occupation troops were simultaneously withdrawn. This
proposal was received favorably in South Korea where the
Korean people were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
US military government. The second proposal was to allow
elected representatives from Northern and Southern Korea to
participate in the discussion of the question.
The Soviet proposal for the immediate withdrawal of
occupation forces was rejected by the West which viewed it as
a step toward the establishment of a communist-controlled
government. The US view was that immediate withdrawal of
forces would lead to disunity and chaos and that the superior
organization and discipline of the communists would enable
them to take full advantage of the resulting confusion. The
Soviets argued that free elections would not be possible until
all occupation troops were withdrawn.
After some consideration, the General Assembly adopted the
US version. The Soviet Union, already viewing the Assembly as
a tool of US imperialism, found this decision completely
unacceptable. First, Korean representatives would not be
participants in the initial consideration of the Korean
question when basic proposals were being drafted. Secondly,
supervision of elections by the United Nations would call into
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question the free character of earlier elections in the Soviet
zone. After the rejection of the Soviet proposal, the Soviet
authorities refused to take part in the work of the commission
unless representatives of the Korean people participated in
the discussion. 35
The General Assembly established a deadline of 31 March
1948 for elections to be held. Representatives of the Korean
people were to be elected to participate in the General
Assembly's future consideration of the Korean question. These
representatives were also to constitute a National Assembly
with the authority to establish a National Government . The
National Government would then organize its own security
forces, assume control of government functions from the
military commands, and arrange with "the occupying Powers" for
the complete withdrawal of their armed forces, within ninety
days if possible. 313
The Commission attempted to notify the occupation
authorities in the North of its decision but was unable to
make contact with the Soviet Military Command or to enter the
Soviet zone of occupation. The Soviet military authorities,
having already expressed their government's view and been
rejected, had no authority to recognize the legitimacy of the
Commission. Any further proposals to achieve the independence
of Korea by the holding of elections and the establishment of
a national government would have to be considered by direct
negotiations between the two governments. 3
24
Since the Commission was unable to carry out the
Assembly's program, it was forced to consult the political
leaders in the South to determine whether or not to proceed
with elections. Once again the nationalist groups, now
political parties, were in disagreement. The rightist groups,
with the exception of Kim Koo ' s Korean Independence Party,
were strongly in favor of immediate elections regardless of
what happened in the North. The moderate and leftist groups
were strongly opposed to holding elections in South Korea
alone. Following the Soviet line of thinking, they argued
that elections could not now be held in a free atmosphere and
a unified Korea would be more difficult to obtain.
Nevertheless, elections were held in South Korea. On 31 May
1948, the elected representatives met in Seoul as the Korean
National Assembly, and elected Dr. Syngman Rhee as chairman.
The Republic of Korea was established on 15 August 1948, the
third anniversary of liberation from Japan. 38
Once the decision was made to hold elections in South
Korea alone and to set up a Korean government there, the
Soviet authorities began creating their own version of a
Korean National Government. A new constitution had been
published by the Korean People's Committee on 1 May 1948.
Early in July the North Korean regime announced that elections
would be held on 25 August for a Supreme People's Assembly of
572 members. On 3 September, after being in session one day,
the Supreme People's Assembly ratified the 1 May constitution.
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On 9 September 1948, the North Korean regime proclaimed itself
a Democratic People's Republic under the leadership of Kim II
Sung. 39
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Since the separation of the Korean peninsula into two
camps of conflicting ideologies, repeated efforts have been
made, and rejected, in an attempt to unify the country. The
dilemma of these many failed attempts at has been most
accurately depicted in this description by Hwang In Kwan
:
The problems of the current Korean impasse in its
reunification efforts is analogous to the dual key system
which is used to control the launch of nuclear missiles;
that is, nothing happens unless both operators agree to
turn their keys simultaneously. 1
While such a analogy might seem ominous in light of North
Korea's reported nuclear weapons development, it is
nonetheless an accurate reflection of the inter-Korean
relationship. With the exception of the 4 July 1972 joint
communique, unification proposals have been made unilaterally
without previous consultation by one Korea with the other.
This style of "negotiation" has resulted in the formulation of
reunification proposals for their propaganda potential rather
than their reunification potential.
These previous reunification attempts, however
unsuccessful, reflected the policies and beliefs of the
administrations within which they were formulated. By
examining these previous efforts the specific reasons for
failure become evident and provide a better understanding of
29
the North-South antagonism that perpetuates the division of
Korea
.
A. 1948-1960 (SYNGMAN RHEE)
The establishment of the Republic of Korea was opposed by
many factions within the South who saw the creation of a
separate state as a further barrier to reunification
.
J
Consequently, the fledgling Syngman Rhee government was forced
to make stabilization of its own national foundation its first
priority. The North Korean regime had already been solidified
under Soviet tutelage which allowed the Kim government to
devote its efforts to building up its military might for a
future attempt at reunification by force. This inward focus
of both countries left any serious attempt at a peacefully
negotiated reunification in the hands of the United Nations.
The South Korean idea of reunification was based on the
premise that the ROK was the only lawful and legitimate
national government in Korea, having been created under the
auspices of the United Nations and sanctioned by a fair
election. On 12 September 1948, the ROK National Assembly
adopted a resolution that reflected this view and offered
guidance to the North:
We hope you, our fellow countrymen in north Korea, will
hold a general election soon in a free atmosphere, in
accordance with the United Nations resolution, as we did,
and elect the true representatives of the people, sending
them to the National Assembly.'
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The resolution reserved 100 seats in the National Assembly for
the duly elected (under UN observation) North Korean
representatives. Thus, as far as the South was concerned, the
foundation for reunification had been laid.
The North took an entirely different view of the issue and
adopted as its reunification policy the overthrow of the South
Korean government by force. A series of communist-led armed
revolts in the South began in October 1948 and encouraged the
North Korean regime to intensify its efforts in this
direction. While it was unclear whether the revolts were
directed by the North or initiated by the South Korean
communists themselves, the atrocities committed by these
groups shocked the majority of South Koreans and led to the
passing of the National Security Law which outlawed communism
and contained provisions for prosecuting communists. The
United States, having already decided to withdraw its troops
from South Korea, supported any action that would effectively
suppress the revolts. Consequently, anti-communism became the
official ideology of the ROK. While this frustrated the
North's ambition to take over South Korea by subversive means,
the North Korean regime never abandoned hope for the military
unification of Korea and increased the tempo of its military
and industrial development accordingly. 4
American policy-makers had ruled out the use of US armed
forces as a means to ensure South Korea's political
independence and territorial integrity. They concluded this
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option carried an unacceptable risk of involving the United
States in a major war in an area in which "all of the natural
advantages would accrue to the Soviets."- By June 1949, the
500-man Military Advisory Group in Korea (KMAG) was all that
remained of US troops in Korea. The risk of a communist
takeover was to be minimized by using KMAG to train the
expanded ROK Army (from 65,000 in March 1949 to 98,000 in June
1950) after the US withdrawal. The ROK Army was to be
supplied with about $200 million in military equipment, with
more military aid promised. 6
Rhee's requests for immediate aid were repeatedly denied
by Washington, even though US intelligence efforts had
observed a substantial military buildup in North Korea. These
requests were denied for three major reasons: (1) the
consensus concerning Korea's low priority in US strategic
planning; (2) Rhee's repeated public pledge to invade North
Korea; and (3) the depletion of US military stockpiles. 7 The
lack of stockpiles delayed the delivery of $11 million in
military aid promised under the Military Assistance Program
for fiscal year 1950. By June 1950, less than $1000 worth of
the military equipment pledged had reached South Korea."
On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces attacked in force
along the length of the 38th parallel. While the North's
stated reason for the attack was to repulse a South Korean
provocation, it soon became apparent that the North was
attempting to unite the peninsula by force. The ROK
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government immediately protested to the United Nations
Commission on Korea in Seoul and asked the US government for
military support.
Although the United States had previously determined Korea
to be of little intrinsic value, the North Korean attack
forced a reevaluation of policy. The previous loss of the US
nuclear monopoly, "loss" of China to communism, and the Sino-
Soviet Treaty, all contributed to the US feeling that
communism was an expansionist force that must be contained and
forced US leadership to see that the aggression of North Korea
had its roots in past US failure to draw the line against the
Soviet Union. John Foster Dulles warned that "to sit by while
Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a




The speed of the North Korean attack and the
unpreparedness of the South ensured DPRK forces of quick
success. Within three days North Korean forces captured Seoul
and announced that the final victory of the people had been
achieved. Kim's armies continued their drive south eventually
pinning down US and ROK troops near the city of Pusan in the
southeast of the peninsula.
General Douglas MacArthur assumed command of UN forces on
14 July 1950 and led a surprise landing at Inchon that pushed
the communists out of South Korea. MacArthur 's advance to the
Yalu was halted when "volunteer" forces from the People's
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Republic of China entered the war on the side of the North in
October 1950. The combined communist forces drove their
opposing forces south once again and recaptured Seoul on 4
January 1951. The UN forces regrouped and mounted a
counterattack which re-took Seoul on 12 March 1951. A front
was finally established near the original division at the 38th
parallel. Over the objections of both Koreas, UN forces
agreed to a Russian proposed ceasefire. Truce negotiations
began at Kaesong in July 1951.
On 27 July 1953, after more than two years of
negotiations, an Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom.
South Korean President Syngman Rhee refused to enter into the
agreement, consequently, the United States signed for the
allied forces. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZj replaced the 38th
parallel as the boundary between North Korea and South Korea
and the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) was set up to hear
complaints about violations of the armistice across the DMZ
.
The Korean War left South Korea's political process as
devastated as were the South Korean people.
The Korean War and the bitter experience under communism
of many South Koreans during the war, deprived leftist
movements in the South of legitimacy, effectiveness, and
even legality. Furthermore, South Korean lost many of her
leaders of moderate political persuasion during the Korean
War, because they chose not to leave Seoul during
communist occupation of the city and were subsequently
taken to the North by the communists. In this way the
Korean War served to liquidate a large number of leftists
and their supporters who failed to leave the South with
the communist forces during their retreat. 10
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As a result, South Korea was deprived of those "centrist"
political leaders who might have led a progressive political
movement
.
Rhee used the war to enhance his political power and
strengthen his hold on the government by eliminating the
remaining leftist groups and creating ideological
conformity. 11 He also persisted in threats to unify Korea by
force, maintaining that "it is no war of aggression to
liberate a part of our own soil." 12 However, his threats of
forced liberation were eventually rendered impotent by the
signing of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty on 8 August 1953.
The Mutual Defense Treaty set forth the key conditions
governing future US-ROK security cooperation. The UN Command
of Korea remained under the control of the US military as was
the representation at MAC meetings in Panmunjom. Since Rhee
had refused to sign the Armistice Agreement, the ROK had only
an observer role at subsequent MAC meetings. 1 Between 1953
and 1960, US forces in South Korea were reduced from 360,000
to 60,000 personnel while US advisors, military aid, and
supplies strengthened the Republic of Korea armed forces. 1 '
The Armistice Agreement required a political conference to
be held within three months of the signing, however, it was
not until the Berlin Conference of February 1954 that such
arrangements were made. 1 ' The resulting Geneva conference
opened on 26 April 1954 with South Korea and 16 UN members who
had sent troops to Korea (minus South Africa) on one side and
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North Korea, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet
Union on the other side. 16
The debate at the Geneva conference centered around three
main issues: (1) the authority and competence of the UN in
dealing with the Korean question; (2) the holding of genuinely
free Korean elections with proportionate representation for
north and south Korea; and (3) the retention of UN forces in
Korea until the creation of a unified, independent and
democratic Korea had been accomplished. These were the basic
principles that the UN considered essential and had stressed
since 1947. 17
The seeming futility of the conference was made manifest
by Rhee's statements throughout the process. Rhee made it
clear that he expected the conference to be unsuccessful:
We hope, therefore, that if and when the Geneva conference
has failed, the United States and our other friends in the
free world will join with us in employing other means to
drive the enemy from our land. 18
It is clear that Rhee persisted in his desire to march North
and was not fully supportive of a negotiated reunification.
The first major confrontation of the conference was over
the issue of elections. The South Korean delegation proposed
elections be held in North Korea only, stressing that
elections had already taken place in South Korea to the
satisfaction of the United Nations. This would have ensured
that the surviving members of the South Korean Parliament
would keep their jobs with Rhee becoming head of the unified
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government. 19 The communists emphatically rejected the
principle of elections in North Korea only and proposed
instead all-Korean elections under the supervision of a
commission composed of representatives chosen by the two
parliaments. The Western powers rejected the North Korean
proposal, having seen the results of such coalition
governments in Czechoslovakia and other Central European
countries now under communist control. 20
On 22 May 1954, ROK Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai
presented a comprehensive fourteen-point proposal for the
unification of Korea that included the holding of free
elections in both North and South Korea. Pyun ' s proposal,
however, maintained a predominant role for the UN in
supervising the elections, determining the proportionate
representation for a new National Assembly, and certifying the
unified Korean government. 21 The communists rejected any
role whatsoever for the United Nations in a Korean settlement.
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov charged that
the United Nations itself had been a belligerent in the Korean
war, that the UN resolutions on Korea in 1950 lacked validity,
that UN supervision in Korea would constitute "foreign
intervention, " and that the Geneva Conference had nothing to
do with the United Nations. This uncompromising rejection of
the authority and competence of the United Nations was
reiterated by the PRC and DPRK representatives who
categorically rejected Pyun's fourteen-point proposal,
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objecting specifically to granting the United Nations a role
in supervising the all-Korean elections. 22
The communists proposed that a neutral nations supervisory
commission be established to observe all-Korean elections.
This commission was to have consisted of an equal number of
communist and non-communist governments and function only on
the basis of "mutual agreement." This arrangement would have
permitted the North Korean delegates, representing an
undemocratic regime exercising control over less than one
third of the Korean population, to veto decisions of the non-
communist majority."'
On 15 June 1954, after nearly two months of discussion and
debate there was no indication that the communist side had any
sincere intention of seeking to resolve the differences on the
two main issues of the authority of the United Nations and the
principle of free elections. Therefore a "Declaration by the
Sixteen," signed by the allied delegations, was introduced
which restated the principles they had consistently supported
at the Conference, pointing out that the communist delegations
had refused to accept these principles and were persisting in
the same attitudes which had impeded UN efforts to reunify
Korea since 1947. Because of the communist rejection of the
fundamental principles considered indispensable by the United
Nations Allies, the Declaration concluded that "further
consideration and examination of the Korean question by the
Conference would serve no useful purpose." 24
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The Geneva conference ended when it became clearly evident
that the communist delegations were determined to stand
uncompromisingly on positions incompatible with the basic
principles of the UN representative powers. Consequently, the
conference did little more than confirm the political division
of the Korean peninsula. 25 The obstinance of the Rhee
government was demonstrated by Pyun ' s statement that failure
of the conference had invalidated the Korean armistice and
therefore the South was free to take any action against the
"Chinese invaders" in North Korea. 26
On 7 March 1955, Kim II Sung proposed a nonaggression
treaty. J7 The Republic of Korea rejected this proposal
because acceptance would indicate recognition of the two
Koreas as sovereign equals, and the South was not ready to
deal with the North on any basis. The administration of
Syngman Rhee clung to its conviction that the only formula for
reunification was a march to the North.
The corruption of the Rhee regime was to prevent his march
to the North or any other attempt at reunification. While
Rhee's elections in 1952 and 1956 were both rigged to some
degree, the 1960 presidential election was blatant in its
corruption. Several student groups had focused their efforts
on "saving democracy" and pursued this goal with fanatical
enthusiasm. 28 On 11 April 1960, the body of an opposition
student, the victim of police torture, was found floating in
the harbor at Masan, a small southeast coast city. Three days
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of rioting ensued. On 18 April 1960, a group of students
returning from a peaceful demonstration protesting police
violence were beaten by gangs recruited by the police chief of
the Presidential mansion. As a result, on 19 April 1960, tens
of thousands of unarmed students converged on Seoul to
protest. The police responded by firing upon the students,
killing many and inciting further rioting and demonstrations.
Rhee, on the advice of the US embassy, announced his
resignation and left Korea on 26 April I960. 29
The North Korean regime tried unsuccessfully to equate the
student demonstrations, which were primarily against the
rigging of the presidential election, to a struggle of the
youth against US imperialists. Immediately after Rhee's
resignation, Pyongyang proposed a joint conference of all
political parties in the North and South to discuss the
establishment of a unified government of Korea.
Although the North Korean propaganda was unsuccessful in
generating an anti-American protest, the collapse of the Rhee
government gave the North a degree of self-confidence. Rhee's
legacy as the first President of the Korean Provisional
Government during the Japanese occupation made him the most
famous independence leader of Korea. The loss of Rhee meant
the loss of the key symbol of the ROK's continuity with the
Korean independence movement and gave Kim a valid excuse to
offer himself as the only "legitimate" revolutionary in
Korea. 30
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B. 1960-1961 (CHANG MYON)
On 29 July I960, a national election put the Democratic
Party, the former opposition party, into power with an
overwhelming majority of seats in the National Assembly. On
3 August 1960, Chang Myon, the former Vice President under
Syngman Rhee, was elected Premier. The second republic was
born and with it an attempt at liberal democratic government.
While Chang's administration sought to establish a true
democratic government, the increased freedom brought with it
student uprisings and increased criticism of the government's
unification policies. Reformist political parties advocated
inter-Korean exchanges and some went so far as to demand the
withdrawal of US forces from Korea. Other reformist parties
demanded the establishment of a neutral, democratic and
unified government based on the spirit of independence and
self-reliance. The organization of the Central Council for
Independent National Unification was expanded, with some
students demanding North-South student talks.
On 14 August 1960, Kim once again attempted to capitalize
on the instability of the South by presenting the idea of a
North-South confederation as a means of achieving peaceful
national reunification. Under this confederation system, a
Supreme National Committee organized by representatives of the
two governments would be established to coordinate cultural
and economic development for the whole of Korea. At the same
time, both sides would maintain their own political system,
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with free and independent activities guaranteed, until the
eventual unification of Korea.
Besides the propaganda value, the North sought to use the
confederation idea to gain acceptance and the formal
recognition of the existence of two sovereign states in the
two parts of Korea. In this respect, the DPRK would achieve
equal status with the ROK, which had already been recognized
by the UN, formalizing the existence of the two sovereign
states recognized in international law. 3 "
This proposal was rejected by the South as another
propaganda ploy, both for its introduction at a time of
political instability as well as its unilateral issuance. In
order not to lose the propaganda edge, the new Chang Myon
government announced a change from the previous
administration's military unification position, "March north
to unify, " to a peaceful one through UN-supervised free
elections." The unification policy maintained the Rhee
characteristics of non-recognition of North Korea as a
sovereign nation.
The credibility of the confederal scheme was eroded when
the North, taking advantage of the South Korean student
demands for a North-South unification conference, established
the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
on 13 May 1961. This North Korean propaganda move worsened
the South's political instability. The inability, or
unwillingness, of the Chang government to use overwhelming
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force to maintain order led to further cleavages between
various opposing factions. 34 On 16 May 1961, a group of
military officers staged a revolution and established a
military government in the South.
C. 1961-1979 (PARK CHUNG HEE)
The new military administration, headed by Major General
Park Chung Hee, announced a revised government platform based
on: (1) ant i -communism; (2) strong ties with the United
States; (3) eradication of all "corruptions and social evils;"
(4) the creation of "fresh morale;" (5) and the establishment
of "a self-supporting economy." 3 " The ideas of North-South
negotiations and unification under neutrality were outlawed,
while the method of general elections in North and South Korea
under the United Nations' supervision was adopted as the sole
formula of unification.
Under the motto of "construction first, unification
later, " President Park Chung Hee proclaimed a policy which
concentrated on building up the ability to win over communism
rather than concentrating on unification. This called for an
all-out effort at building national power based on the
development of economic power. Any serious attempts at
reunification were to be postponed until the South achieved
economic, military, political, cultural, and social
superiority over the North. Until such superiority was
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In reaction to Park's ant i- communist policy, North Korea's
unification policy was changed from a "peaceful approach" to
one promoting an internal communist revolution in the
South. 3 Kim emphasized his changing attitudes by
capitalizing on the neutral approach he had taken to the Sino-
Soviet rift and negotiated military alliances with the Soviet
Union (1 July 1961) and China (11 July 1961) .
In spite of the political turmoil brought on by the Park
coup d'etat, the ROK population and economy had continued to
grow. While a great boon to the country, this economic growth
had spawned serious dissent in the ROK. The Pyongyang
government was anxious to capitalize upon this political
dissent by creating Vietnamese-style revolutionary conditions
in the South. The number of "incidents" that occurred between
US/ROK and DPRK forces rose from 59 in 1965 and 50 in 1966, to
566 in 1967 and 629 in 1968. 38 These efforts failed to
strike a responsive chord in the South, however, and served
only to anger and frighten the South Korean public.
North Korea's aggressive attempts at subversion reached a
high-water mark on 21 January 1968 when a 31 man commando unit
infiltrated the South to assassinate Park and came within
several hundred feet of the presidential mansion in Seoul.'
Under questioning, the lone survivor of the abortive attempt,
Lieutenant Kim Sin-jo, disclosed that his unit had trained for
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two years for this mission and that there were an estimated
2,400 North Korean commandos undergoing special training in
North Korea for additional guerilla missions in the South. 40
Events in the international political arena had an even
greater effect on events in Korea. In March 1969, fighting
broke out between Russian and Chinese forces along the Ussuri
River. This fighting was followed by discreet Soviet
inquiries as to what the American response would be if the
Kremlin should authorize a pre-emptive attack against Chinese
nuclear facilities. Acting in line with Henry Kissinger's
theory that it was better to side with the weaker instead of
the stronger antagonist in a triangular relationship,
President Richard M. Nixon determined that the United States
could not allow China to be defeated in a Sino-Soviet war.
Nixon adopted a strategy similar to North Korea's in dealing
with China and the Soviet Union: "to refrain from tempting
either side into retaliation or blackmail by giving the
impression that the United States was "using" it against the
other." 41 Simultaneously, Nixon took steps to reach Sino-
American and Soviet-American detentes.
The improved relations between the United States and the
two communist giants reduced the number of US adversaries in
the world and led to the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine on
25 July 1969. The Nixon Doctrine insisted that US military
involvement in world affairs would be used only to supplement
the contributions of friendly nations defending their own
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sovereignty where there v-ere ongoing hostilities. While the
most obvious manifestation was gradual withdrawal of American
troops from South Vietnam, the first substantial application
of the Nixon Doctrine was in Korea, where 20,000 US troops
were withdrawn in the fall of 1970.
The US-USSR detente and the improving Sino-US relations
had a spillover effect on the Korean peninsula, effecting a
change in the basis of South Korea's policy toward the North.
In February 1970, William J. Porter, the American Ambassador
to Seoul, testified before Congress that the United States was
moving toward opening a dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang.
Washington further encouraged a direct North-South contact and
suggested that the two Koreas be admitted simultaneously to
the UN General Assembly. 42
Faced with the prospects of Sino-American rapprochement
and general trends towards a detente in the Far East, the
Seoul government began to stress efforts to improve relations
with the North. On 15 August 1970, Park declared a new policy
which laid out the preconditions for peaceful unification,
indicated the policy direction the South would take when those
preconditions were met, and proposed a peaceful competition
between the South and the North under the premise that the
North Koreans renounce their war-provocation policy.'1
President Park's declaration was taken to suggest the
possibility of a dialogue between the authorities of South and
North for the first time in the quarter-century of division.
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The changing external environment was a mixed blessing for
the North Korean regime. The recognition of two Koreas,
direct North-South negotiations, and the withdrawal of US
troops from the peninsula were goals the North had been
striving for and had not yet given up. Yet the US detentes
were seen to be threatening to the DPRK's alliances and a
means of isolating the North. On 12 April 1971, Kim proposed
an eight-point proposal for peaceful unification, with the
confederation plan as a transitional step. By calling for
talks at Panmunjom or in a third country "at any time, " the
North Korean regime put pressure on the South to respond.
An inter-Korean dialogue finally resulted in September
1971. Beginning with a conference of the North and South Red
Cross societies, talks soon shifted to high-level officials.
The high-point of this series of events was the North-South
Joint Communique issued on 4 July 1972 in which the South and
the North agreed to promote unification based on the three
grand principles of independence, peace, and grand national
unity. 44
This signalled a sweeping change in the unification policy
of the South Korean government. First, the North Korean
regime was recognized as the other entity in a dialogue or in
negotiations. In other words, the idea of "two Koreas" was
accepted. Second, direct and peaceful dialogue between the
direct parties, South Korea and North Korea, replaced the
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previous emphasis on having the United Nations handle the
question . 45
The optimism with which the talks began gave way to
frustration as they progressed. Disagreements continued over
the issue of free travel between the countries, US forces in
the South, and the proposed simultaneous entry of North and
South Korea into the UN. 46 By 10 June 1973 North Korean
propaganda resumed and after 12 July 1973 all diplomacy
ceased. Over 22 months there had been 58 conferences in which
2,337 members of the press and 1,084 negotiators were
involved; 210 news reports and 325 officials crossed the DMZ
.
A telephone hot line linking Seoul and Pyongyang was the only
tangible result. 47
On 18 January 1974, President Park proposed a
nonaggression pact based on the principles of noninterference
and the continuation of the armistice . 4S As the North had
made similar propositions since 1963, based on US force
withdrawal and mutual troop reduction, Park's failure to
include these issues led to a denouncement by Pyongyang two
days later.
The reunification policies of the two regimes remained
divergent throughout Park's administration. The tendency to
use reunification proposals for propaganda and strategic
purposes indicated neither government was seriously interested
in pursuing peaceful unification. Instead the issue of
reunification was used as an opportunity to appease domestic
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pressure and world opinion while justifying continued military
rule and restrictions on individual liberty on both sides of
the DMZ . President Carter, during his visit to Seoul from 29
June-1 July 1979, proposed talks involving the two Koreas and
the United States. Both Koreas responded by insisting that
the armistice must first become a peace treaty before ROK and
DPRK would again have direct discussions.
Any plans for further reunification initiatives in the
Park administration were ended with the assassination of
President Park on 26 October 1979. The assassin, Kim Chae
Kyu, Park's director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency
(KCIA), believed that he himself was the best man for the
presidency and that by killing the president and controlling
the martial law force he would be able to take control of the
government. Military leaders, however, quickly responded to
the crisis and maintained control of the ROK government
.
Martial law was immediately instituted and placed under
the command of General Chong Sung Hwa, general chief of staff
of the ROK Army. On 27 October 1979, upon receipt of official
orders of President Park's death, General John A. Wickham,
commander of the US armed forces in Korea, ordered American
troops in Korea into an escalated state of defense readiness
condition."' This increased defense posture was seen by the
North as a demonstration of US imperialist support for the
South' s "fascist Yushin system." The North proceeded to use
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the opportunity to once again call for the total withdrawal of
US forces from South Korea. 50
The DPRK leadership also capitalized on the situation by
expanding their propaganda efforts into a retrospective of the
administration of the "heinous, fascist dictator Park," and
his characterization as a "brutal butcher and killer." The
ROK provisional government's announcement that it would pursue
democratic reforms was heavily criticized by the DPRK
government which depicted it as a smokescreen for the
continuation of Park's Yushin system that would continue
"ruthlessly repressing those students and patriotic masses who
are demanding a democratic society and independent national
reunification." 51 To observers of the situation in Korea
there was little in the way of inspiration for future talks on
reunification
.
D. 1979-1980 (CHOI KYU HA)
With the assassination of Park, Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha
became acting president of the interim government until his
own election to the presidency on 6 December 1979.
In spite of Choi's repeated pledges for "political
development," statements from North Korea immediately
denounced the Choi government as a perpetuator of Park's
repressive Yushin system. The new government was called on to
immediately repeal the Yushin system, eliminate the Korean
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) , release ail political
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prisoners being held in South Korea, democratize society and
achieve the peaceful reunification of the country through
alliance with communism. Moreover, the United States was
called on to withdraw military forces and nuclear weapons from
South Korea and to not interfere in the internal affairs of
South Korea. 52 A 14 December 1979 cabinet reshuffle was
unsuccessful in placating the North since those members newly
appointed to the cabinet had been strong supporters of Park's
administration .
Simultaneous with its denunciation of the Choi
administration, the DPRK leadership took advantage of the
confusion and chaos in the South by proposing reunification
talks for propaganda value. On 24 January 1980, the Pyongyang
government proposed a North-South prime ministers' meeting.
From 6 February to 20 August 1980, ten rounds of negotiations
were conducted in preparation for the meeting. However as the
political situation of the South began to stabilize, the North
suspended the contacts. 54 On 10 October 1980, North Korea
advanced the confederal idea once again but this time referred
to it as the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo and




The election of Choi to the presidency was seen as a way
to ease the political transition following Park's
assassination. However, Choi was indecisive in meeting
increasing student and opposition demands for a new
51
constitution and democratic transition, resulting in
demonstrations and protests. As the student demonstrations
became more intense and widespread, and the government proved
unable to cope with them, the opportunity once again arose for
military intervention in politics.
On 17 May 1980, the entire nation was placed under martial
law and the army-backed government proceeded to round up
dissidents and opposition politicians. The crackdown led
immediately to a nine-day uprising in the city of Kwangju.
Because the police were unable to control the several thousand
demonstrators, Special Paratrooper Forces were called in to
deal with the demonstrators. The brutality of these
paratroopers inflamed the townspeople who joined in with the
students. On 27 May 1980, army troops conducted a final
assault and Kwangju was placed under military control. S(
Choi was perceived as having generally mishandled the
situation in Kwangju which added to his reputation for
"bumbling" in the eyes of the American military.
Consequently, the ROK army put strong pressure on Choi to
resign thus paving the way for Chun Doo Hwan to succeed
him."
E. 1980-1988 (CHUN DOO HWAN)
Following Park's assassination, Major General Chun Doo
Hwan, head of the Defense Security Command, was charged with
the investigation of the assassination. Chun found "evidence"
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to implicate several senior officers, including his own
superiors, in the assassination. After their arrests, Chun
was placed in command of the military. A limited martial law
had been put into effect upon Park's assassination but Chun
persuaded President Choi to declare a more extensive
nationwide martial law to supersede it. Under the new martial
law, Chun, who had also been named Acting Director of the
KCIA, was not only responsible for maintaining law and order
in the country but was also in charge of the government . Chun
increasingly bypassed President Choi and arrested and removed
many of the opposition leaders from the political scene in the
name of political purification. 58 On 22 August 1980, Chun
resigned from the army and on 30 August was elected president
by the rubber-stamp electoral college, the National Conference
for Unification (NCU). 59
As was to be expected, the North rejected the decision of
the NCU and condemned the election of Chun. As with the
administration of Choi, Chun was seen as a perpetuator of the
Yushin system. Chun's former positions as head of the DSC and
the KCIA contributed to the North's labeling him a "truculent
strangler of democracy" whose "usurpation" of the presidency




President Chun's efforts at reunification were no more
successful than those of his predecessor's. On 22 January
1982, Chun made public a unification formula that called for
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participants from both sides to meet under the principles of
national self-determination, democracy and peace in order to
draft a unified constitution. Final unification would be
accomplished through federal elections held in both sides
under the terms of the constitution. North Korea denounced




The election of Chun was followed closely by the election
of Ronald Reagan in the United States. Mr. Reagan's hard-line
anti-communist stance, as well as domestic controversy over
the legitimacy of the new South Korean government, led North
Korea to reduce its emphasis on the issue of US military
withdrawal and focus efforts elsewhere. The Pyongyang
government instead turned its attention toward accelerating
its offensive against the Seoul government. This activity was
highlighted by the 9 October 1983 bombing at Rangoon, Burma




The Rangoon incident was intended to kill Chun and top
government leaders of the Seoul government, generating maximum
confusion in the South and providing an opportunity for a
"people's revolution." Pyongyang proposed a tripartite
meeting in January 1984 in an attempt boost anti-government
forces in the South and at the same time to make the North
appear to be seriously interested in peace on the Korean
peninsula. This activity was bolstered by the provision of
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relief goods to the South, the 1984 North-South Economic
Meeting at Panmunjom, Red Cross talks at Seoul and Pyongyang,
and various Parliamentarian meetings. These efforts were not
motivated by genuine concern but were aimed at improving South
Koreans' perception of the North. 63
North Korea's efforts were complicated by Seoul's upcoming
1988 Summer Olympic games. The North anticipated a successful
Seoul Olympic Games having the same effect as the 1964 Tokyo
Olympic Games had on Japan - focusing international attention
on the ROK and providing opportunities for additional trade
and commerce. The North Korean economy had continued to fall
further behind that of the South and the Rangoon bombing had
only served to turn international public opinion against the
North, resulting in the further isolation from the rest of the
world. Pyongyang tried several attempts at negotiations with
the International Olympics Committee (IOC) for joint
sponsorship of the 1988 Olympics but was unsuccessful. To
make matters worse, the participation of the Soviet Union and
many East European countries in the Seoul Games had been
confirmed, frustrating the North's attempt at organizing a
boycott. The North's desperation was made evident on 30
November 1987, when North Korean agents blew up KAL Flight 858
in an effort to cast doubt on Seoul's ability to provide
security for the Games.
The North continued with image building efforts throughout
the rest of Chun's administration by proposing a three-way
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military meeting on June 17, 1986, a high-level South-North
political and military meeting on January 11, 1987, a multi-
national disarmament conference on 23 July 1987, a tripartite
foreign ministers meeting on 6 August 1987, a joint South-
North conference on 1 January 1988, and a joint North-South
parliamentary meeting on 20 July 1988 to discuss the issue of
the US military presence in Korea. 64
As the end of the Chun administration drew nearer, some
doubt arose as to the sincerity of Chun's promise for a free
election. The skepticism centered on the disagreement between
Chun and the opposition over what form an elected government
would take. Public pressure and an increase in campus
demonstrations had forced Chun to agree to negotiations on the
issue, however, many feared that Chun might try to force an
unacceptable constitutional change through the National
Assembly. The US government responded with increased pressure
on the ROK government to agree to a constitutional plan that
would produce a democratic system. 65
On 13 April 1987, Chun ordered a halt to all debate on the
discussion of constitutional change for the selection of the
next president until after the 1988 Summer Olympics had been
held (and a president elected) . In a nationally broadcast
address, Chun told Koreans that he would keep the present
electoral college system of selecting a president - a system
that could be easily rigged to the government's advantage. 51
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Chun's decision marked the turn to a harder official line
and a crack-down on government opposition. Kim Dae Jung, a
prominent anti-government figure in South Korea, was placed
under house arrest and by mid-May 1987, at least a dozen of
the opposition party's 67 National Assemblymen were under
indictment or investigation on charges ranging from parking
offenses to forgery." When Chun announced the selection of
former ROK Army General Roh Tae Woo as his chosen successor on
10 June 1987, demonstrations erupted throughout Korea.
The end of the demonstrations were brought about
unexpectedly on 29 June 1987 by the chairman of the ruling
party itself - Roh Tae Woo. Roh called for constitutional
reform for direct presidential elections as well as the
reinstatement of political rights of Kim Dae Jung .
'
: This
led to talks and an eventual compromise between government and
opposition leaders concerning the basic outline of a new
constitution
.
North Korea responded to the selection of Roh and the
subsequent turmoil during the waning days of the Chun
administration by calling for a general overthrow of the South
Korean "military dictatorship." The North saw the selection
of Roh, a former ROK Army Lieutenant General and leader of
army forces in the Kwangju incident, as another example of the
continuation of the Park-Chun military dictatorship and called
for the people of South Korea to force "military gangster" Roh
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out of the presidential race and carry on direct presidential
elections without him. 69
F. 1988-1992 (ROH TAE WOO)
President Roh Tae Woo ' s inauguration in February 1988
marked the beginning of a new era in ROK policy toward North
Korea. The issue of Korean unification had achieved a level
of public debate unmatched in previous administrations. The
worldwide effects of Gorbachev's policy of Glasnost
contributed to the strength of the discussion and the
unification issue was adopted by the radical students in the
South as their chief issue of protest. As a result, Roh was
under immediate pressure to formulate a new policy toward
North Korea. 70
In order to retain the initiative in government hands, Roh
issued a declaration on 7 July 1988, outlining a new, more
flexible policy toward North Korea. Upon taking office, Roh
announced that South Korea would no longer seek to isolate
communist North Korea but instead would work with the United
States and other allies to help integrate the North into the
international community. This policy of integration rather
than isolation also put pressure on the United States to
implement a similar shift in its policy toward the Pyongyang
government. The United States, having taken its lead from
Seoul, had maintained no diplomatic relations with the North
and continued to classify it as a terrorist state. 7:
Roh's policy of Nordpolitik , or "Northern Politics," was
designed to open diplomatic and economic channels with
communist, socialist, formerly-communist and formerly-
socialist nations. 7 ~ The six-point policy called for human
exchanges, trade between North and South Korea, and improved
diplomatic and trade relations between Seoul's key allies, the
United States and Japan, and Pyongyang parallel to better ties
between Pyongyang's main backers, China and the Soviet Union,
and Seoul. By integrating the security interests of the ROK
with the economic interests of the communist countries, South
Korean relations with China, the Soviet Union, and other
Communist countries, would be transformed from cross-contact
to cross-recognition as either formal or de facto recognition
was granted. 73
The policy was effective in restoring links with Seoul's
former communist adversaries and led to a 19 August 1988
meeting between North and South Korea, their first talks since
1985. Yugoslavia opened a trade office in Seoul in October
1988. Diplomatic relations with South Korea were established
with Hungary on 1 February 1989 and Poland on 1 November 1989.
Eventually, even greater diplomatic coups were realized with
the 4 June 1990 agreement between Roh and Gorbachev to
establish diplomatic relations and the 24 August 1992




The dissolution of the Soviet Union produced further
opportunities for the expansion of Roh's policies. Russian
foreign policy makers were determined to forego the use of
ideology and military issues to drive their foreign policy
initiatives and instead focused their attention on economic
issues. This policy change led to a formal agreement by South
Korea to help Russia convert much of its defense industry to
peaceful purposes 74 followed by Russian President Boris
Yeltsin's visit to South Korea on 18 November 1992. Though
Yeltsin's visit was to focus on economic issues and joint
ventures, it also resulted in the signing of the new treaty of
amity wherein Moscow pledged to help Korea's peaceful
reunification. 7 ' Although exactly how this would be
accomplished was not made clear, Amangueldy Irguebaev,
political counselor at the Russian Embassy in Seoul, stated
"Moscow has no plans to renounce the mutual defense treaty it
signed with Pyongyang in 1961 but would not let it stand in
the way of improving ties with Seoul." 7 ' This approach
allows Moscow to maintain relations with both North and South
Korea and provides an opportunity for inclusion in eventual
reunification talks.
Although the apparent initial success of Nordpolitik
inspired some hope for unification efforts, divergence of
Northern and Southern policies continued. The August 1988
talks between North and South Korea failed primarily over the
disagreement in linking the Olympic Games with a nonaggression
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pact. 7 However, two important results were obtained. The
first was North Korea's apparent concession that a
nonaggression pact could be signed before US forces began
withdrawing gradually form South Korea, a tremendous change
from their former intransigence on this issue. 78 The second
was an agreement to resume talks once the Games were over in
October. The disagreement over Olympic issues was expected,
however, many diplomats and observers believed the talks would
break up amid verbal hostilities. The decision to continue
contacts was unexpected and raised cautious hope for improved
relations between the two Koreas. 79
On 4 June 1990, the ministers of North and South Korea met
in Seoul for their first meetings since 1988. A series of
talks began and on 13 December 1991, after many months of
seemingly futile negotiations, resulted in the leaders of
North and South Korea signing a treaty of reconciliation and
nonaggression, renouncing the use of armed force against each
other. This action when implemented may effectively end their
43-year-old state of war. The agreement also reestablished
some measure of regular communication between the two
countries, including telephone lines, mail, some economic
exchanges and the reunion of some families who have been
separated since war broke out in 1950. Although the accord
failed to deal with such issues as North Korea's attempts to
develop nuclear weapons, officials on both sides described the
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accord as the first step toward what they term the inevitable
reunification of the Korean peninsula. 80
As the end of the Roh administration drew nearer, concern
on the peninsula was focused on North Korea's nuclear program.
In July 1992, North Korea proposed tripartite talks with the
United States and South Korea concerning nuclear policy.
Previously, the North had proposed such three-way talks to
give the impression that the United States was a necessary
participant for South Korean officials to make such policy
decision. However, this latest proposal was viewed more as a
face-saving and encouraged US and ROK authorities to give more
credence to the idea. 81
By October 1992, the issue of nuclear inspection remained
an unresolved issue, and the United States and South Korea
announced the resumption of their annual "Team Spirit"
exercise. In response, North Korea pulled out of the series
of talks that had been ongoing since the signing of the
nonaggression treaty, effectively ending further discussion of
reunification in the final days of the Roh administration.
G. POST-1992 (KIM YOUNG SAM)
The election of President Kim Young Sam was the most
peaceful transition of power in the history of South Korea.
There were no riots in the streets and few charges of
electoral fraud as there were in previous elections. Kim's
victory with 41.4% of the vote indicated "the South Korean
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people voted for stability and comfort; for change but within
the comfort zone of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party." 82
This tranquil beginning is minor compensation for the many
important decisions facing Kim in his pursuit of an effective
and successful administration. In addition to economic
reform, expansion of the democratic policies begun by Roh, and
maintaining the precarious political balance that is sure to
befall the first true civilian administration, Kim must cope
with the full consequences of Nordpolitik and an increasingly
isolated communist regime. Perhaps most importantly, Kim will
have to contend with Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program which
remains a dangerous stumbling block to reunification as well
as a threat to regional security. As with the end of every
previous administration, the division of the Korea peninsula
remains a testament to the Cold War but with a North Korea
more internationally isolated and possibly more desperate.
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IV. POST-COLD WAR CONSIDERATIONS
After the liberation from Japan, and through every
proposal since then, both North and South Korea have
considered the reunification of the peninsula an issue to be
resolved by the Korean people. Cold War tensions, however,
placed the matter within a broader context of super-power
strategy. Improved relations between the major powers in the
region have shifted attention away from the Cold War
implications of the issue and created a new environment within
which to address the internal (political-military, economic,
socio-cultural ) and external (foreign relations) factors that





The divergent ideological paths of North and South Korea
presents the greatest obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the
Korea question. While the reduction of Cold War tensions
cannot easily change the attitudes and the distrust each side
has built up toward the other, some easing of obstinancy has
occurred. The evolution of South Korean democracy has
produced an environment of change wherein the Seoul government
has attempted to ease inter-Korean tensions as world tensions
have eased. Pyongyang resists these overtures and clings to
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the belief that the socialist system of the DPRK will
ultimately triumph.
Since its establishment in 1948, North Korea has been
under the leadership of Kim II Sung. Kim has maintained an
absolute monopoly of power and created a cult of personality
that has elevated him to near deity-like status in his
country. His one-man dictatorship has been preserved through
a combination of his personal charisma and his skill az
manipulating the masses. Kim's political legitimacy has been
further strengthened by his perceived nationalist fervor
manifested in his chuch '
e
(national self-reliance) ideology.
Kim has channeled this nationalist expression into purges of
his opponents and the installation of a repressive system of
internal control that has helped him consolidate and
strengthen his political power. This has enabled him to
create and maintain one of the most repressive regimes in the
world.
North Korean national policy goals have been shaped by the
conviction that it is the only legitimate government of the
Korean people and the peninsula. The fact that it controls
only the northern half of the peninsula is attributed to the
interference of the United States and the "outlaw" government
of the ROK . Kim continues to express his intention to unify
the peninsula and to actively support and encourage the South
Korean people in their "revolutionary struggle against the
American imperialist aggressor and its puppet government in
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the South."" He has persisted in his efforts to isolate South
Korea politically and overshadow it economically by
selectively soliciting military and economic aid from Soviet
and Chinese allies. Even though the North accepted this aid,
efforts continue to focus on building its economy and military
with its own resources to limit outside influence. By
focusing national efforts on military requirements first,
North Korea has developed strong military forces with
available resources for launching an offensive.-
The general charter of the Korean People's Army is to
protect socialism and defend North Korea. More specifically
its role is to support Kim II Sung's authoritarian oligarchy
and to unify the peninsula militarily if conditions favor a
quick victory. Because of Kim's reliance - on the military,
high-ranking military officers hold key positions within the
party and government and oversee all military and supporting
civilian programs. North Korea depends on the armed forces to
implement national policy and gives them top priority for
personnel, supplies, and resources. 4 Consequently, the armed
forces are an important element of the party's power base in
North Korean society.
Concerned with continuing his ideology after his death, the
80 year-old Kim has pursued an active campaign to ensure that
control of the party, and the country, passes to his eides"
son, Kim Jong II." Documentary films have been produced about
Kim Jong II 's life emphasizing his concern for the Korean
71
people. Having already been appointed supreme commander of
the Korean People's Army in December 1991, these films seem to
be part of an effort to build his image as a worthy successor
to his father. 6
In spite of the vastly divergent modern political cultures
that exist between the Koreas, the post-Cold War environment:
has produced some positive change. Kim's persistent refusal
to conduct business with the UN took a dramatic turn with the
admittance of both Koreas to the UN. While Kim's previous
intransigence on this issue was based on his claim that it
would perpetuate the division, the real purpose was to
eliminate outside interference in the Korean agenda thus
allowing a revolutionary takeover of the South by supporting
a "people's democratic revolution." Having attempted to put
this policy into action in 1950, Kim's decision to join the UN
signalled the North's first official change in its previously
overt hostile outlook."
During its seminal stages, the South Korean government
adopted a stance similar to that of the North both in its
claim to be the only legitimate government in Korea as well as
in the dictatorial behavior of its first leader. The 1950
attempt by the North to force reunification left the two
countries in a highly tense and hostile relationship and
created a situation wherein the ROK government was compelled
to try to cultivate democracy while struggling for national
survival. Although a form of democracy has emerged, the
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hostile conditions and persistent subversive activity of the
North has resulted in a democracy decidedly different from
that of the United States, Japan, and Western European
countries
.
Though rooted in the principles of a civilian democracy,
the continued development of South Korea's government was
markedly influenced by the US and the ROK militaries. US
concerns over the containment of communism led to continual
economic and military assistance to make the South a stronger
ally against the North. With substantial US aid and technical
support, Korea's army and air force were built up enough to
discourage the North from attempting another invasion. The
military became a powerful political and economic force and
"the most technical and scientifically advanced sector in
Korean society."" This led to the creation of a highly
developed military-industrial complex within the South which,
in turn, led to a highly trained and equipped South Korean
army and the development of a military elite.
General Park Chung Hee, capitalized on his own position
within this elite by leading a coup d'etat and setting control
of the South Korean government in 1961. Once firmly
established in power, Park filled many of the high-ranking
government positions with his military comrades. The
subsequent quasi -coup by General Chun Doo Hwan further
entrenched the military in the Seoul government and made it an
important element in South Korean politics. In this respect,
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the functional role of military leaders in official positions
of government is comparable to the role of military leaders in
the North.
Since the 1987 presidential election, however, President
Roh Tae Woo has set out to create true democratic reform and
began to depoliticize the military establishment that has
controlled the country's political process. In December 1990,
the ROK government announced a new code of conduct for armed
forces personnel that established detailed regulations barring
them from political activities. Roh quietly and methodically
retired politically ambitious senior officers and appointed
generals with professional reputations to the key posts in the
armed forces. In March. 1991, he publicly warned his
politically active relatives that "the next president should
come neither from the army nor from my family circle.""
Increased national self-confidence has contributed to
other reforms in this sometimes oppressive South Korean
system. On 10 April 1992, a South Korean Defense Ministry
official announced a general review was to be conducted of 41
laws to find obstacles to improvement of inter-Korean
relations. For example, potentially offensive terms such as
"North Korean Puppet Clique" would be changed to "North
Korea." 1 ' Even the Mi . _tary Security Protection Law, enacted
after the 1972 proclamation of the yushm system, was declared
by the Constitution Court to have "limited constitutionality,
"
paving the way for greater freedom of the press and greater
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public access to information. These laws were seen co have
"lost their validity amid changes in reality, including the
climate of rapprochement that has been created between North
and South Korea. " u
B. ECONOMIC
The economies of both North and South Korea have done
well, especially considering the post-Korean War devastation
from which they began. Kim II Sung ' s leadership provided
political stability and a highly centralized economic
approach. The economic development of North Korea has been
carefully planned by the Pyongyang government which
established distinct periods of economic development: (1) the
post WWII/pre Korean war' (1945-50), (2) the three-year
rehabilitation period (1954-56)
, (3) the five-year plan (1956-
61), (4) the first seven-year plan (1961-67), (5) buffer years
(1967-70), (6) the six-year plan (1971-76), (7) buffer years
(1977-78), (8) the second seven-year plan (1978-84), (9)
buffer years (1984-86), (10) the third seven-year plan (1987-
93) , 12
During the first and second periods, Pyongyang
reconstructed factories and steadily built a socialist system.
By using the highly centralized Stalinist system as a model,
the North attained collectivization and rapid
industrialization. However, as the economy developed and its
structure became more complex, this centralized command
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economy became a major handicap and served to slow down the
rate of growth. 13 A severe imbalance was created between
heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture and from the
third economic development periods onward, North Korea's
economic progress has steadily declined. 14
The North's internal economic problems were compounded by
difficulties in loan repayments to other countries. In August
1987, 120 Western banks formally declared North Korea to be in
default on $750-810 million in loans. 1 " This resulted in
Pyongyang's trading partners demanding payment in cash before
conducting business. The collapse of the Soviet system and
accompanying economic problems forced the Moscow government to
reduce and eventually end its economic aid to the North. The
chuch'e system has become a true test of the North's self-
reliant capability.
South Korea's economic development initially lagged behind
that of the North but grew rapidly with US assistance and the
five-year plans of President Park. This growing economic
development was spurred even further by the normalization of
diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965 and support for the US
effort in Vietnam. 11, The growth of the South Korean economy
has continued and now far surpasses that of North Korea. In
1990, South Korea's GNP was more than ten times greater than
the that of North Korea ($237.9 billion to $23.1 billion.)
while the per capita GNP was more than five times greater
($5, 569 to $1, 064)
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Cut off from its traditional source of economic aid and
faced with a stagnating economy, Pyongyang has been forced to
look elsewhere for help. Early in 1991, Fyongyang approved
direct trade between North and South Korean trading companies,
the first such approval in DPRK history. This included $4
million worth of South Korean color TV sets and sugar in
exchange for 100 thousand tons of North Korean coal. By the
end of November 1991, the total volume of North-South trade
reached $150 million." In January 19 92, Daewoo chairman Kim
Woo Choong, the first business leader to be officially invited
to the North, agreed to establish eight light industrial
factories in North Korea with an investment of $10-20
million
.
And yet, even in the face of imminent economic collapse
the Pyongyang government continues with the illusion of
chuch'e. Rice and other foodstuffs received from the South
were required to have any identifying marks removed and
replaced with those of the DPRK. Markings on South Korean TV
sets were replaced with markings of North Korean
manufacturers. Even the ships that brought goods to the Nor::.
were required to travel under the flag of a third nation to
prevent North Korean dock workers from knowing they were
receiving aid from their Southern brethren.
-
In December 1991, in order to alleviate its economic
crisis and to respond to economic difficulties caused by the
collapse of the socialist economic sphere, North Korea
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disclosed its plan to form a "free economic trade zone" in the
Tumen River region near the border with Russia and China.
-
:
The remarkable aspect of this initiative was Pyongyang's
proposal that South Korea and Japan join the international
project. Interpreting the signals coming from Pyongyang, it
seems that North Korea has determined to discard the
unproductive economic policy of self-reliance and boost its
sagging economy by building up labor-intensive, export-
oriented industries with foreign capital and technology.
—
Although limited, these may be North Korea's first steps
toward economic reform.
Much of the inspiration for this economic activity stems
from fears of a German-style unification or, even worse,
economic collapse of the DPRK. The North is painfully aware
that this kind of unification resulted in the political system
of the socialist East being "swallowed up" by that of the
West. The South has become cognizant of the tremendous
economic costs that would be incurred both through absorbing
the debt and rebuilding the infrastructure of the North.
With these lessons in mind, both countries seem to be opting
for more economic cooperation and renewed efforts for a
peaceful, and voluntary, reunification.
C. SOCIO-CULTURAL
The conflicting ideologies under which the Korean people
have lived for nearly half a century have produced social and
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cultural differences that will influence reunification of the
peninsula. Even a 5000-year homogeneous tradition and culture
must suffer from the effects of opposed ideologies and
divergent paths of modernization and industrialization.
North Korea is one of the most isolated and secluded
societies in the world. The "cult of Kim" pervades all
aspects of society. The individual is expected to show
loyalty to Kim II Sung by studying his philosophy daily.
Education is directly controlled by the party and is used as
a means of indoctrination in communist ideology. The people
in the North have been infused with the idea that revolution
by force is necessary and war is an inevitability.
The North Korean system concentrates on the nuclear
family, breaking up the extended family and imposing a
communist lifestyle on the total population to eliminate
traditional cultural values. These traditional values and
heritage are viewed negatively by the Pyongyang leadership
because they are seen as threats to the party's authority and
prestige. Knowledge of other people and world events is
filtered through government controlled media before being
transmitted to the masses. Information about the South is
presented in the context of poor economic and social
conditions. To Pyongyang, the ROK government remains a puppet
regime of the imperialist Americans." 1
As for the South, even under years of repressive
authoritarian rule, a democratic trend has emerged to shape
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the South Korean society. The experience of the Korean War
and land reform in the 1950 's changed South Korea from a rural
and agrarian to an urban and industrial society. The gains
made in industrialization, urbanization, education, and
communications in the 1970s led to drastic rearrangements of
social and economic relationships. 25 As a result, a dual
social system has developed in contemporary South Korea. One
is kin oriented, hierarchical, formalistic, Confucianist , and
emphasizes tradition. The other is community oriented,
egalitarian, informal, and stresses significant change. In
spite of the dissimilarity, most Koreans accept both systems
with equanimity .^
The key to resolving the cultural and social differences
between the North and South will be the willingness of the
Korean people to accommodate each other in a changed
environment. It will be necessary to determine which aspects
of Korean culture each side has retained and those aspects
that each has abandoned in order to foster a unified style of
new cultural traits. Social customs that come from new
ideological orientations will need to be identified, studied,
and, when applicable, adopted. Both sides will need to seek
commonality that will bring them together, rather than
emphasize those differences that would separate them."
80
D. FOREIGN RELATIONS
Even though the question of Korean unification is of less
concern to the international community in the post -Cold War
world, the resolution remains of interest to, and will be
influenced by, the four big powers in the region: the United
States, Russia, China, and Japan. North and South Korea will
be left to their own devices for resolution of the conflict as
long as the means are peaceful and regional stability 15
maintained. If this condition continues, the four powers will
no doubt be willing to accept a variety of changes in the
status quo, although the trend toward resolution of Korea's
division will be carefully monitored.
The common thread that runs through the policies of the
four big powers is the desire to prevent any exclusive,
monopolistic hegemony by one power in East Asia. The four
major powers are becoming less hostile toward each other in
East Asia. The national interest of each is to maintain peace
and stability. For the foreseeable future, the four powers
will attempt to reduce tensions in Korea as a means ::
reducing overall tensions among themselves.
1 . United States
The fundamental approach of the United States toward
the two Koreas has not greatly changed in the post-Cold War-
period, although some initiatives have occurred that could be
optimistically referred to as advances. During January and
81
February 1990, the South Korean government stopped protesting
the US troop cutbacks and accepted the closure of three US Air
Force facilities. By June 1990, Seoul also agreed to bear the
cost of relocating the US army facilities at Yongsan, located
in the central part of the city, to a new location south of
the capital near Osan Air Base. 28 Although its military
presence has been reduced, the United States remains the ROK's
main economic and military ally.
With the US-ROK relationship stable, the next step for
the United States is to place additional emphasis on improving
relations with the DPRK. In November 1988, the United States
and North Korean governments began talks in Beijing at the
embassy counsellor level, but this has resulted in little more
than face-to-face contact. In late 1989 former senior State
Department official Gaston Sigur became the first senior US
figure to visit North Korea in a decade, while in 1990 North
Korean academics also visited the United States. - '
More positive steps occurred on 13 May 1992 when North
Korea turned over 15 coffins to the United States believed to
contain the remains of US servicemen missing in action from
the Korean War. 8,177 American servicemen are still
unaccounted for while at least 389 were known to have been
held alive at the end of the war.' Settlement of the MIA
issue is one of the issues the United States has declared must
be resolved as a prelude to better relations with North Korea.
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The other issue is the question of North Korean nuclear-
weapons development
.
The issue of North Korean nuclear weapons development
is disturbing not just to the US-ROK alliance but to the
entire Asian region. Even with the strong US-ROK
relationship, continued US pressure on the North could
eventually cause a split within that relationship if US
actions are seen to be an impediment to the unification
process. For its part, the United States removed all nuclear-
weapons from the South, which were neither confirmed nor
denied having actually been there, and canceled the "Team
Spirit" military exercise for 1991. The United States also
exported $10 million worth of wheat to North Korea in late
1991, part of a reported $1.2 billion deal made by the US
administration. This was claimed to be for humanitarian
reasons allowable after a 1988 revision of the US lav; on
trading with the enemy. 31
In spite of US contributions to the effort, Kim has
persisted with his anti-US rhetoric:
Taking advantage of the disappearance of their military
rival and the destruction of the balance of forces, the
modern imperialists are scheming to maintain and extend
the old order of domination and subjugation, pinning hope
on their military superiority."
Although the United States continues to support the
peaceful reunification of Korea as a policy goal,
Washington's attitude will remain ambivalent toward the issue.
The policy makers in Washington believe that unification is an
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internal matter which should be left to the Korean people.
The United States will quietly support unification as long as




After the Smo-Soviet split in 1956, the DPRK was
confronted with the challenge of trying to maintain a
semblance of neutrality in the face of mounting pressure for
support from its communist allies. Pyongyang's initial
response was to straddle the fence and maintain the semblance
of an equidistant relationship with both countries. However,
as the implications of the situation became more apparent, the
Pyongyang government used the opportunity to capitalize on its
position. By skillful political leaning toward one country -
or the other - when conditions warranted, the DPRK was able to
acquire aid from both Beijing and Moscow without giving up its
political independence.
With the end of the Cold War, and the breakup of the
Soviet empire, Pyongyang has been forced to give up its
reliance on Moscow for aid. The priority of Russia's Asia
policy has shifted from military to economic interests as its
own economy has deteriorated. The end of the Cold War also
lessened the strategic value of North Korea for Russian
security; hence, the Russians have come to appreciate the
economic value of the ROK more than any inherent value of a
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relationship with the DPRK. At their San Francisco meeting on
4 June 1990, which symbolized the beginning of the Cold War
thaw in Korea, Roh and Gorbachev agreed to establish full
diplomatic relations.' 4
The impact of Russian-South Korean rapprochement on
Russian-North Korean relations resulted in a transition from
a military alliance to a normal neighborhood relationship just
as the former Soviet Union developed with the East European
countries. It is also plausible that improving relations with
South Korea was an attempt to pressure Pyongyang to reform and
open its closed political system." In sharp contrast to
Gorbachev's visit to South Korea, no top Soviet or Russian
leader has gone to North Korea despite Kim II Sung's seven
trips to the Soviet Union.' 1 '
Like the United States, Russia is content to leave the
unification issue to be resolved by North and South Korea.
Moscow's main concern is to maintain stability in the North.
There is a general consensus within Russian, United States,
and South Korean political circles that the world community
must build a policy concerning the DPRK proceeding from two
principles. The first involves limiting North Korea's
terrorist aspirations, especially its nuclear plans. The
second one entails exerting influence upon the DPRK with the
purpose of turning it into a more open country that embraces
the road of reform in Asian socialism. :
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3 . China
While North Korea was successful in its attempt to
maintain a political balance between China and the Soviet
Union, the similar ethnic and cultural traditions resulted in
a natural tendency to lean more toward Beijing. Perhaps an
even greater factor was the role China played by intervening
and rescuing the Pyongyang government from the brink of
disaster in the Korean War. With North Korea's increased
isolation in the wake of glasnost and the decline of the
socialist systems, China remains the only country that
provides economic assistance.
In December 1990, North Korean Prime Minister Yon
Hyong-muk visited Beijing and reportedly received a promise of
about $300 million (primarily food and oil) in relief aid. By
December 1991 North Korea had actually received about one
million tons of oil. However, even China's willingness to
support the Northern regime had its limits as it declined to
increase support for the North Korean regime when Kim II Sung
visited China in October 1991. ib China's hesitancy to give
additional assistance to the North had as much to do with
increased Smo-Soviet cooperation as with China's own attempts
at economic reform.
The developing Soviet relationship with the ROK also
affected China's relationship with the South Korean
government. China followed the Soviet lead and by 1990 had
established official trade relations with South Korea. Sino-
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South Korean trade grew to $3.82 billion in 1990, several
times the figure for Smo-Soviet trade,-' and China, along
with the Soviet Union, promised not to block South Korea's
application for a seat at the United Nations. Pyongyang,
perhaps sensing increasing international isolationism, also
accepted a separate UN seat. 40
During 1991, China tilted even further toward Seoul
reasoning it would be better off improving relations with
South Korea and that it had less to lose if the Soviet Union
should improve relations with North Korea. As the Soviet
Union continued to breakup and South Korea's relationship
easily converted to a relationship with Russia, PRC leadership
gradually became less suspicious of ideological differences
and more appreciative of the economic advantages to better
relations with the ROK
.
On 13 April 1992, South Korean Foreign Minister Yi
Sang-ok met with Chinese Premier Li Peng who recommended
closer political ties between the two countries, saying that
leaders of the two nations should frequently cross-visit to
promote understanding. For the first time they specifically
stressed the need for diplomatic normalization. In a meeting
with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, they shared the
opinion that a diplomatic normalization would contribute
greatly to peace and prosperity in the region and agreed to
work closely together to establish ties. 4: On 24 August
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1992, these diplomatic efforts resulted in the signing of a
normalisation agreement between the ROK and the PRC
.
North Korea responded to the new relationship between
South Korea and China with silence. News service attempts to
obtain comments from the North Korean Embassy in Beijing were
unsuccessful. However, on 25 August 1992, North Kore a
began to restrict Chinese tourists coming into the country.
This was North Korea's clearest sign of its displeasure with
the establishment of ROK- PRC diplomatic relations."'
The question of reunification produces two responses
within the government of the PRC. While some seem to hope the
status quo will continue for the indefinite future," others
support reunification and would like relief from the burden of
having to choose between the two Koreas. In the latter view,
a unified Korea, maintaining good relations with China, would
in fact be good for China's security situation. 4 " Despite
Beijing's relations with Moscow, Tokyo, and Washington, it
cannot ignore Pyongyang because the security of Korea has been
closely linked to the security of China itself since the
1950's.
4 . Japan
Japan's colonial rule over Korea created deep
animosities that continue to taint and impede full development
of ROK-Japan and DPRK-Japan relations. Koreans resent what
they regard as Japanese exploitation and manipulation, and
frequently accuse Japan of working to keep the peninsula
divided. Japanese are regarded as looking down upon Koreans
and Korean culture, especially in their treatment of the
sizeable Korean minority in Japan. 4 "
A January 1991 visit by Japan's prime minister Toshiki
Kaifu paved the way for development of better relations
between the two countries. President Roh Tae Woo made a
reciprocal visit to Tokyo in the same month and secured a
promise that finger-printing of all ethnic Koreans in Japan
would soon end. Emperor Akihito and Kaifu both apologized to
Roh for Japan's wartime atrocities towards the Koreans. 4
Other issues, such as the trade deficit and technology-
transfer, continued to remain irritants to the two countries
relations
.
Tokyo's relations with Pyongyang, while improved,
remain much more ambivalent. The first step toward
normalization occurred on 27 September 1990 when the North
Koreans announced to a visiting Japanese delegation that they
wanted to start government -level negotiations on normalizing
relations toward Pyongyang. 48 Normalisation talks between
North Korea and Japan, however, hit a snag v/hen Pyongyang
demanded compensation for Japan's colonial rule over the
Korean peninsula in 1910-1945, as well as for post-war
damages. Tokyo only acknowledged Pyongyang's right to seek
property damages linked to colonial rule, but not those
incurred afterwards. Another sticking point was Japan's
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insistence that North Korea sign a nuclear safeguards
agreement to provide inspection of its nuclear facilities by
the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Pyongyang-Tokyo
dialogue was temporarily halted after North Korea backtracked
on an earlier pledge to sign the non-proliferation treaty in
Vienna in September 1991. 49
Japan's approach to a unified Korea is tempered by
different and sometimes conflicting interests. Some Japanese
fear that a united Korea would be motivated to turn its
military attention toward them. Korean animosity is tempered
by economic reliance on Japan and Japan's stronger political
position. A united Korea, on the other hand, may have the
ability to translate anti-Japanese words into action/ In
this respect, the policy of maintaining two Koreas could be in
the Japanese national interest. Regardless, Japan considers
the security of South Korea to be important to the economic,
political, and military interests of Japan. Tokyo remains the
number one foreign investor in South Korea. And the hostile
division remains the key destabilizing factor in the region.
Japan will probably continue to pursue the maintenance
of peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and play a
positive role in the process of Korean unification. In this
regard, Japan's ongoing negotiations with North Korea for the
establishment of formal relations has an important bearing on
the future of the Korean peninsula, and, accordingly, must
proceed prudently so as to contribute to the smooth
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development of the North-South relations, and enhance peace
and unification of Korea. 51
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V. OPTIONS FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA
The governments of North and South Korea have used the
issue of Korean unification as a propaganda platform for
nearly five decades. Both governments have made it a practice
to propose unification plans purely for propaganda value while
completely rejecting the proposals of their counterparts.
However, the international political climate has changed, and
continues to change, allowing the issue of Korean unification
to be approached in a new attitude of sincerity and
cooperation
.
A unified Korea must be decided according to the
collective will of the ' entire Korean people. No
unification formula is meaningful nor can it be
materialized unless it is rooted in a national
consensus l
North Korea has clung to the position that the question of
Korea's reunification should be solved by Koreans themselves
without interference from outside forces. While this appeal
to Korean nationalism is a persuasive argument it also raises
strong suspicions among South Koreans about the real
intentions of the North Korean leadership. Exclusion of the
United States from the process hints at the real intentions of
the Pyongyang government to use appeals to nationalism to turn
the situation into a civil war. South Koreans see the North's
plan as a means of forcing an American troop withdrawal ar.d
excluding international involvement from the Korean
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resolution, after which the North would invade the South under
the guise of national liberation. Consequently, Pyongyang
sees the presence of the United States as a major obstacle to
making its unification program acceptable to the South Korean
masses .
-
However much the North would like to pursue its own
unification plan, events in the world may force both Korean
governments to seek a more congruent political path. The
collapse of the Soviet Union has further isolated the North
while the South still enjoys a strong alliance with the United
States. The South has opened relations with Russia and China
while the North still clings to Chuch'e and the decaying
socialist path. The deteriorating economy of the North has
created pitiful living conditions while the South' s economy
has developed strongly and enjoys a trade surplus with several-
nations. The election of Roh Tae Woo was a step toward true
liberal democracy while the North still suffers under the
repressive dictatorial regime of Kim II Sung. And the
successful 1988 Seoul Olympics brought South Korea to the
wider attention of the international community and cast doubt
on the logic of the socialist revolution which included the
"liberation of South Korea."''
Eoth countries deeply distrust each other and are aware
that this distrust has prevented any sincere efforts at
political reconciliation. The reasons for this hostility have
been ingrained into the collective psyche of the Korean
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people. First of all, the perception each Korea has of the
other as the enemy has created an incredible sense of
insecurity and led to the massive buildup of military forces.
Second, North and South Korea have been governed under two
distinctively different political ideologies since 1945. The
influence of these ideologies on development has created South
Korean economic and industrial systems that have far surpassed
those of the North. Third, memories of the Korean Wat-
continue to haunt the Korean people and influence the
relationship between them. Finally, any unification proposal
elicits the question, "who is going to win" and adds to the
mutual suspicion. 4
The current stability of South Korea, both politically and
economically, places it in a position of strength in dealing
with the North Korean regime. However, using this position to
pressure or coerce the North would only result in greater-
intransigence and instability. A more effective approach
would be to adopt a policy of accommodation in dealing with
North Korea. In this way, the focus of the relationship would
be on recognizing and settling grievances of the North through
negotiations and compromise.' At the same time, it would be
necessary for the South not to be extravagant with its
accommodation. While this primarily one-sided compromise
avoids a resort to violence as a means of settling
disagreements, the North would interpret excessive
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accommodation by the South as a confession of weakness and be
tempted to respond accordingly.
Both North and South Korea have established plans for the
unification of Korea, but each is based on unification with
retention of their own political system. The real answer will
not come about until both countries place the peaceful
unification of the Korean peninsula above the political
interests of their respective governments.
A. STEPS TOWARD POLITICAL INTEGRATION
There are two major factors that must be considered in an
examination of the unification options. First, it is highly
doubtful that full political integration will be achieved
while North Korea is under the leadership of Kim II Sung.
Kim's self -enshrinement and iron-handed rule makes it highly
improbable that he would willingly surrender to the virtual
destruction of the system he has nurtured and perpetuated r li-
nearly fifty years.
The second consideration is that hasty efforts to
integrate the two conflicting systems into a single system
might result in a chaotic and potentially violent situation.
Korean nationalism has produced numerous competing factions,
each of which has a vision of what a unified Korea should be.
The sudden merging of the two systems would create a highly
volatile situation. Perhaps a better example of swift
integration, and one which is much more likely, would be based
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on the economic collapse of the North. In this event, a
unitary government would occur with Seoul becoming the capital
of a unified Korea. This is an not an option currently
desired by either the Seoul or Fyongyang governments. For any
attempt at peaceful reunification to work it is necessary for
the process to proceed on a gradual step-by-step basis.
The approach most likely to succeed is a building-block
approach using various stages for building mutual trust and
understanding/' Within this framework, a series of medium-
range goals would be established to serve as interim steps on
the path toward eventual unification. The advantage of this
system is that it allows both countries to work within a
smaller framework and allows for gradual change without either
country being at a disadvantage during the process. Within
each stage, steps would then be taken to accomplish the short-
range, tension reducing and trust building initiatives. The
establishment of these medium-range plans also helps to reduce
the anxiety created by focusing solely on the long-range
reunification plan. Additionally, this system allows for
stages to by bypassed as mutual trust is built.
Finally, even under Kim's rule, and barring an economic
collapse in the North, this system would allow for progress
through the first three stages resulting in an officially




The first stage in the framework is hostile
coexistence and is built around two conditions: (1) the
intention of one Korea to reject the existence of the other,
and (2) the existence of internal and external restraining
conditions which prevent both Koreas from engaging in war.
These are the characteristics of the relationship North and
South Korea have endured since the division. Within this
stage, both countries maintain opposing political systems and
the military forces necessary to ensure their survival. Small
conflicts and skirmishes occur but, in general, major military
confrontation is avoided.
The major drawback to this stage of the framework is
that it prevents further movement toward tension reduction and
trust building efforts. A temporary ceasefire agreement is
the only restraint to military conflict with no guarantee
against the threat of broken peace agreements. Neither side
will recognize the existence of the other, thus preventing any
form of a mutual exchange program.
The national interests of the regional powers have
been, and will continue to be, directly or indirectly related
to the Korean situation. As a result these powers have
encouraged the maintenance of the status quo, at a minimum, to
prevent another armed conflict on the peninsula. As
international relationships continue to change, both Koreas
will be encouraged to move beyond this first stage and toward
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a more stable peace structure, although not necessarily toward
full unification.
2. Neutral Coexistence
As conditions improve between the two countries, the
relationship will begin to shift to one of neutral
coexistence." Four conditions have been set forth comprising
this stage: (1) recognition of each Korea by the other, (2)
signing of a non-aggression agreement, (3) mutual
understanding of the impossibility of applying force, and (4)
agreement to maintain the DMZ line along the 38th parallel.'
The important factor in this framework is that it allows for
the "normalization" of relations without requiring detailed
unification plans or the alteration of either government's
structure. It is a confidence building measure that furthers
the potential for future cooperation.
The advantage of this stage is that it avoids war and
reduces, or even eliminates, a continued hostile relationship
between Seoul and Pyongyang. The main disadvantage is that,
while it does not require the alteration of either
government's structure, it does require the alteration of some
governmental policies. The DPRK maintains its stated policy
to communize the whole of the peninsula and achieve peace
after unification through a people's war. The ROK maintains
its National Security Law which defines North Korea as an
anti-state entity and punishes those who "praise, abet, or
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even visit North Korea." 10 In order for this stage in the
framework to be achieved both Koreas must change their
policies
.
In December 1991, events tended more toward this stage
when North and South Korea signed a bilateral nonaggression
pact. This pact promised a renewed emphasis on exchange
between the countries including phone lines, mail service,
railroads, highways, reuniting families and limited economic
exchanges. More importantly, each side pledged not to commit




The new and developing relationships between the other
regional powers give additional support to the idea of neutral
coexistence. It is in the best interest of all to reduce
tension on the Korean peninsula, and, at the same time,
preserve the status quo with its distribution of power.




Once a condition of neutral coexistence has been
achieved, efforts can be made to move toward a condition of
detente. A state of detente existed between the United States
and the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1979 and provides the best
example of the desired outcome. The motivation for the US-
USSR detente was the realization that a Soviet -American war
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would probably destroy the world as we know it. The resulting
detente produced numerous summits, cultural exchanges,
technical reoperation and a growth in US-Soviet trade. : -
In its application to Korea, the stage of detente
would elevate the communication process to a state of
continuous, uninterrupted political dialogue. By the time
this state has been reached, the two governments will have
sufficiently reduced tensions which would facilitate reunion
visits of divided families, economic exchange, and other
limited social and culture interactions. The official plans
of both North and South have been based upon some kind of
detente, but the plan of each has been to the detriment of the
other . - :
Detente theory argues that better relations betwe
international adversaries must begin with steps taken at the
top. As soon as th--- leaders agree, other forms of interaction
v/ill follow more easily, eventually gaining a momentum of
their own.-" A step toward this end was taken in September
1991 when both Koreas received membership in the Unite.;
Nations. Other common memberships in intergovernmental
organizations would further increase this interaction. Once
mutual diplomatic recognition developed, additional efforts
would be put forth to create some degree of political
community uniting them at the highest level. This would
involve close cooperation at both the personal and national
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levels to prevent threats to the political structure and to
guarantee the people's freedom of movement.'* 1.
Another step toward detente is through cross-
recognition. The cross-recognition plan, initially presented
by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975, called for
the United States and Japan to recognize North Korea
diplomatically in exchange for China and the Soviet Union's
opening of diplomatic relations with South Korea.' The
development of these relationships would make alliances and
treaties negotiated by each half of the peninsula increasingly
irrelevant and would lead to the consideration of new
alliances and treaties in the context of a unified country.
This would contribute to further erosion of residual Cold War
attitudes and lead to a more pragmatic approach toward non-
ideological issues such as travel and trade.
4. Confederation
The next stage in this process would be the
establishment of a confederal form of government. As
described by Professor Gabriel Almond 1 , under this
decentralized form of administration, a central government is
formed with power over foreign affairs and defense, but is
dependent on financial and other support from the component
states to implement this power. Although both North and South
Korea agree to some extent concerning the potential merit of
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adopting a confederal system, disagreements exists over
specific proposals.
The idea of a confederation was first proposed as an
interim plan by Kim II Sung on 14 August 1960. The proposal
was viewed by North Korean academics and officials as a
necessary response to the divergent developmental paths of the
two systems. In 1949, the differences between North and South
systems were within manageable limits, and free elections
throughout Korea would have allowed for setting up a
centralized government and unifying the systems. By 1960,
however, systemic differences had widened to such an extent
that the immediate establishment of a unified government
became an unrealistic goal and a system of confederation was
proposed as a transitional measure.
-
:
At the time of the 1960
•
proposal , North Korea had .a
political edge on South Korea and this unification scheme was
seen in the South as little more than an attempt to draw Seoul
into a confederation and then turn it into a communist
system.- It was not until the 4 July 1972 joint communique
and the establishment of the South-North Coordinating
Committee to implement the communique that a resemblance of
compromise was achieved. However, the North's emphasis :t
political issues (deemed premature by the South, which desired
a more gradualist approach) and the South' s emphasis on
cultural and economic exchanges to build trust first (deemed
as obstructionist and considered delaying tactics by the
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North) contributed to the failure to produce any substantial
accords
.
By 1980, the gap between the two systems had widened
still further so that the idea of an eventual systemic
unification had to be abandoned. Hence, North Korea proposed
a confederation of the two separate systems as the most;
appropriate form of a unified state. Under this plan,
economic, legal, and social matters would be handled by the
ROK and DPRK as they wish. The central government would have
a secretariat with limited functions which would not make law
but would rely on moral persuasion. The two Koreas would
cooperate in seeking solutions to mutual problems without
giving up their autonomy. The central government would not
have supremacy over the two regional governments and would not
act directly upon individuals in 'the confederation. The plan
calls for both sides to cut their military strength to
100,000-150,000 each and prohibit the presence of foreign
troops and foreign military bases. It further suggests
repealing all treaties and agreements with other countries,
including military treaties, that are considered detrimental
to national amity.
While some South Korean officials saw merit in some
aspects of the plan, the proposal was viewed as simply a means
to force the withdrawal of US troops from Korea after which
North Korea would foment "national liberation" in the South.
The South Korean government argued that, as presented by the
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North, the confederation plan denies the SNCC which was sec up
on the basis of the 4 July 1972 joint communique as the
principal point of contact. It was considered too ambiguous,
not a fitting model for the two Koreas which have long had two
divergent ideologies and socioeconomic systems, and an attempt
by North Korea to legitimate itself internationally as equal
to South Korea. 20
On 22 January 1982, Chun Doo Hwan proposed a counter-
offer of sorts in the Formula for National Reconciliation and
Democratic Unification. The formula consisted of a seven-
point provisional agreement of basic relations between South
and North Korea. The proposed agreement featured the
maintenance of mutual relations based on the principle of
reciprocity and equality, renunciation of the use of arms
against each other, non-interference in each other's interna,
affairs, stoppage of the arms race, promotion of mutual
exchanges and cooperation, mutual respect of each other's
agreements and treaties with third countries, and the creation
of their respective permanent missions in each other's
areas .--
The similarities between the two ideas of
confederation were not strong enough to overcome the basic
differences. Pyongyang wasted no time in rejecting Chun's
overture, while calling him "a traitor" who was inciting
confrontation between the two Koreas in order to keep the
peninsula permanently divided."
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While the North's proposal was initially seen merely
as a means for communization of the peninsula, the system
itself may have a great deal of merit if used impartially.
Under the DPRK plan a Supreme National Confederal Assembly
(SNCA) would be formed with an equal number of representatives
from each side and appropriate representation d£ overseas
Koreans. A Confederal Standing Committee (CSC) would be
organized by the SNCA to guide the regional government in the
North and South and to administer all affairs of the
confederal state. The SNCA and the CSC would make up the
unified government of the confederal state.
The function of the unified government would be (1) to
guide the two regional governments, (2) to evaluate political
affairs, national defense problems, foreign affairs and other
questions of common concern, (3) to push forward the work of
equitable development of the entire peninsula, and (4) to
increase cooperation between the North and the South in all
areas. The regional governments would each follow an
independent policy within the limits consistent with the
fundamental interests and demands of the whole nation.
-
North and South Korea would continue to be sovereign states,
with separate armies, yet would be able to try to narrow then-
differences by creating joint bodies to develop exchanges,
trade and foreign policy cooperation under a single flag.- -
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5 . Commonwealth
The establishment of a commonwealth is perhaps the
most important stage in the progress toward full unification
of the Korean peninsula. This framework serves as an
intermediary state between confederation and federation. The
homogeneous population of Korea and the existence of only two
states makes the confederal system a viable interim measure ac
best. On the other hand, the formation of a federation
requires the surrendering of national sovereignty to the
sovereignty of the newly formed federal government . A
commonwealth forges the link between the confederation, with
its weak basis for unification, and the federation, with its
stronger basis for unification. The commonwealth proposal has
the potential to satisfy the conditions which realistically
divide the two Koreas, while at the same time striving for the
common goal of unification.-"'
The idea of a Korean Commonwealth was proposed by
President Roh as an intermediary step in his Korean National
Community Unification Formula (KNCUF) . The Commonwealth would
contain a Council of Presidents who would function as the
highest decision-making organ. A Council of Ministers, co-
chaired by the Prime Ministers, would consist of approximately
ten cabinet ministers from each side and would deal v/ith the
various issues of the divided Korea through five standing
committees -- 1) humanitarian affairs, 2) political affairs
and diplomacy, 3) economic affairs, 4) military affairs, ana
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5) social and cultural affairs. A Council of Representatives,
made up of approximately 100 legislators from each side, would
have the responsibility to draft a constitution for a unified
Korea, formulate methods and procedures for unification, and
advise the Council of Ministers. After the Council of
Representatives agreed on a draft of the constitution, the
constitution would be finalized through the democratic process
and followed by general elections for a unified legislature
and a unified government.""'
Roh's KNCUF proposal was immediately rejected by the
North. Although the traditional objections to the plan were
voiced (presence of US forces, etc.), the similarities between
the KNCUF and the DCRK contributed as much to the North's
negative response as did the differences between the two
plans. By rejecting outright the North's DCRK proposal,
Seoul's proposal was interpreted as an act of arrogance.
~
Should the two countries reach a state of relations
wherein compromise is acceptable, the commonwealth may be
found to be a suitable alternative to the current division.
By first establishing this commonwealth, integration could be
achieved between the diametrically different North and South
Korean societies. A common sphere of national life would be
established with the purpose of restoring and strengthening a




The formation of a federal form of government is the
next stage toward which both Koreas would work. A federation
differs from a confederal system in two main respects: (1) a
federal government is usually stronger than its constituent
governments with regard to organization, personnel, budge:,
and jurisdiction; (2) a federal government can act directly on
individuals in all matters within the scope of the national
government, whereas a confederal government can act only
through its constituent government.-"
The central focus of a federation system is the
division of power between a central government and regional :
r
state governments (Seoul and Pyongyang) . The two states
would merge their foreign affairs, military defense, economic
systems, and legal systems, while retaining limited power in
social matters performed through their officials and laws
within their proper spheres of authority. Initially, the
central government would maintain responsibility for external
affairs, while the regional government would deal with
internal affairs.
7 . Unitary Government
The final step of this political integration process
will be the shift to a unitary government. This highly
centralized system of government has power and authority
concentrated at the center. Regional and local units have
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those powers specifically delegated to them from the central




The development of a unitary government is a natural
progression for the development of Korean political
integration. The framework for this type of system is already
present in the system of provincial government that exists in
South Korea. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that
Japan also follows a unitary system of government. The South
Korean government, while not admitting it publicly, has relied
on the Japanese model to help shape its own path for the
future
.
On 11 September 1989, Roh presented his Korean
National Community Unification Formula (KNCUF) proposal in a
speech to the ROK National Assembly. In addition to outlining
the principles to guide unification, this proposal designated
the type of government for the final unified Korea. First,
the unification process should be guided by the principles of
independence, peace, and democracy. Second, the unified Korea
should be a democratic nation that guarantees the human rights
of every individual and his right to seek happiness. This
rules out the existence of any system that allows for specif;!
privileges, positions, or powers to specific individual,
group, or class. Third, the legislature of the unified Korea
should be a bicameral parliament composed of an upper house
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based on regional representation and a lower house based on
populac ion .
The KNCUF proposal will not be readily accepted by the
DPRK, nor should it be expected under current conditions. The
avenue remains, however, for progress toward building trust
and reducing tension and eventually establishing a politically
integrated Korean peninsula. At the same time, the KNCUF
could serve as a model for a "German solution, " providing a
strategy for a more quickly phased unification should the
circumstances prevail.
B. OTHER ALTERNATIVES
The continued rule of Kim II Sung, as well as his probable
succession by Kim Jong II, casts serious doubt on the full
fruition of politi-cal integration on the Korean peninsula in
the near future. Because of this, two additional alternatives
need to be addressed: North Korean subversion of the South and
unification through the use of armed forces. Both of these
alternatives have been attempted by the North and under
certain conditions could be attempted again.
1. Subversion of South Korea
The failure of the DPRK to unite the peninsula by
force in 1950 resulted in a policy of guerilla warfare in the
1960s and 1970s. By 1962, Kim had drawn three conclusions
about the ROK: (1) in spite of the political turmoil brought
on by the Park coup d'etat, the ROK population and economy had
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continued to grow and was far surpassing that of the DPRK; (2)
Park's military background and emphasis on accelerated
industrial growth, underscored his commitment to military
strength; and (3) the economic boom had spawned serious
dissent in the ROK . Kim had not surrendered his option to
unite the peninsula through force but when the Soviet aid
needed for conventional combat was suspended, Kim began
considering Mao's concepts of unconventional war to bring
about reunification.
His chance came when Park dispatched approximately
46,000 ROK soldiers and marines to assist the United States in
Vietnam. Kim saw this as possibly his last opportunity to
unite the country before the ROK troops came back benefitting
from combat experience and the acquisition of new American
weapons. From November 1966 until December 1969, American and
South Korean forces battled North Korean special operations
teams across the whole of the peninsula finally frustrating
Kim's attempts at large-scale guerilla warfare.
Kim's rationale for his unsuccessful guerilla warfare
attempt was based on the assumption that unification would
come about if Seoul should prove unable to maintain its
economic and political systems, and if it did not come
naturally then Pyongyang would attempt to weaken South Korea
by subversion. Currently, the Seoul government is politically
stable, economically strong, and continues to maintain a
strong alliance with the United States. Additionally, North
114
Korea's economic situation makes it doubtful that it would be
able to support such subversion in the foreseeable future.
2. Unification by Force
The final scenario to be addressed is the possibility
of an attempted armed "liberation" of one Korea by the other.
North Korea attempted exactly this in 1950 and, while failing
in its attempt, scored a kind of victory by preventing the US-
led UN forces from conquering the North. Beth Seoul and
Washington are committed to a military buildup of the ROK to
deter or defeat any additional attempts at forced unification.
The idea of liberation by force was also an official
policy of the South Korean government, beginning with the
Syngman Rhee administration and not officially abandoned until
President Park's Joint Communique of 4 July 1972. Subsequent
president's have indicated similar abandonment of this idea
(Chun's 12 January 1981 and 5 June 1981 proposals for a South-
North summit, Roh ' s policy of no more isolation, and signing
of non-aggression treaty) and Southern initiatives have
demonstrated the sincere desire for peaceful resolution to the
Korean division. Furthermore, any attempt by the South to
"liberate" the North would result in the receipt tf a
destroyed, as well as impoverished, North Korea.
The greatest external factor for stability on the
Korean peninsula, as well as the rest of Northeast Asia, is
the presence of US forces. As the post-Cold War era continues
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to take shape, and new alliances and governmental systems
emerge, these countries will view the United States as the
neutral force preventing single power hegemony. The question
that arises is when North and South Korea unite, will the
United States continue to have a role on the peninsula?
1
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VI. KOREAN UNIFICATION AND US INTERESTS
During the Cold War era, US foreign policy objectives in
Korea were based primarily on utilization of the strategic
value of the peninsula's geopolitical position in Northeast
Asia. It was here that the major regional powers met and vied
for control of the peninsula, either as a buffer for
protection or as a route for further expansion. The United
States played a unique role in this scenario in that, while
not an Asian country in the geographic sense, its national
interests were closely tied to developments in the region.
The primary interest of the United States in Korea luring
these years was to contain Soviet expansionism. To this end
the United States provided aid and assistance to the ROK in
exchange for military bases, personnel support, and seme cost-
sharing. 1 The evolving process of redefining US national
interests refined US policy toward Korea to three basic and
interrelated security tasks: (1) global strategy; (2) regional
balance; and (3) local deterrence.
~
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, decades-old
security policies have become obsolete, necessitating
reevaluation of US global strategy. The unification cf Korea
will most likely call for a similar reassessment of local
deterrence, since the US role of "tripwire" will also become
unnecessary. The final consideration, and the one entailing
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the greatest commitment on the part of the United States, is
what role the United States will play as a security factor in
the region. This shift in circumstances now requires a
reevaluation of Cold War inspired alliances and treaties, and
an assessment of a unified Korea's effect on the major powers
in the region and their policies.
A. REGIONAL EFFECTS OF REUNIFICATION
Korean unification will occur not as a solitary event, but
will blend with several other broad and interrelated trends
that are at work in the process of ending the Cold War in
Asia. First, political alignments are being transformed with
the end of the bipolar system that has dominated for so long.
Second, nations are placing increased emphasis on economic
factors. Third, pragmatism is winning over ideology in
international relations. Finally, the failure of the
communist system has become a trend, the effects of which are
being felt even in Asia. 3
Assuming a process of peaceful unification, the impact of
these factors indicates that, at least for the short-term, the
security environment of a unified Korea will remain relatively
placid. The United States would obviously not be a threat nor
would Russia, Japan, or China which, having already made
efforts for improved relations with a divided Korea, would
most likely continue to pursue friendly relations with a
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unified Korea. What will be important is the impact a unified
Korea will have on these countries in the longer term.
1. Russia
The geographic proximity of Russia to the Korean
peninsula was unaffected by the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. Assuming the Russian Republic does not: itself
disintegrate, the approach to better relations made by the
former Soviet leaders is just as appropriate for the leaders
of the Russian Republic.
Russia will most likely continue to focus its energies
on its own development, trying to adapt to a free market
economy and break away from the communist mindset . The most
practical course of action in this respect would be to reduce
strategic and conventional military forces to allow material
and personnel to be devoted to the process of industrial
conversion of goods and services. Having been offer-:;
membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, 4 Russia has taken its place in the world economy and is
unlikely to resort to military threats which could have an
adverse effect on the capital, technology and management
expertise provided by Europe, Japan, and the United States.
The breakup of the Soviet Union has left Russia with a
proportionally greater eastern region than it did of the
Soviet Union as a whole. Former Soviet as well as Russian
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Republic leaders hope that Korea, along with Japan, can help
develop the frozen wilderness of Siberia.
A number of South Korean companies have already begun
investing in the Russian Republic. In this regard, Russia may
prefer the benefits it can derive from a wealthy South Korea
to the reduced assistance resulting from a costly Korean
reunification. Nevertheless, Russia undoubtedly recognizes
the future potential of a reunified Korea and will be more
likely to assume a cooperative relationship because of its own
need for continued economic assistance.
2 . China
The greatest impact Korean reunification would have on
China would be the decreased regional influence brought on by
the loss of China's alliance with the DPRK. Notwithstanding
this alliance, the basic characteristic of China's foreign
policy, as with other socialist countries, is its links to
internal politics. It was this linkage that led to the
establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and
China on 22 August 1992, formally ending more than 40 years of
hostility.' A reunified Korea will serve to reinforce a




China's primary concerns are the issues of political
and economic reform. Deng Xiaoping' s efforts to bring about
economic reform have been criticized by some hard-liners who
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see it as betrayal of Mao's spirit and the communist system.
The more prosperous provinces have taken more pragmatic, less
ideological, positions leading to concerns of resurgent
"warlordism. " 7 This has been further compounded by the
crackdown on the pro-democracy movement at Tiananmen Square,
and concerns over similar incidents. Additionally, as the
aging leadership passes away, new pressures will come to bear
on the new leadership for political reform as well. Refusal
to do so could lead to violence within China with the
possibility of it spilling across the nearly 900-mile border
shared with Korea.
China needs an extended period of peace in order to
modernize its economy, upgrade its industrial and defense
capacity, and become strong enough to defend itself in the
face of any future external threats. Consequently, the
Beijing leadership needs to create and maintain political
stability and unity at home and a peaceful environment in the
surrounding region. The principal sources of the capital and
technology needed to modernize China are Japan, the United
States and Europe. China desires healthy relations with the
other nations in the region in order to maintain economic
cooperation. This is true of Korea and, to an even greater-
degree, Japan. Consequently, these premises should lead China
to pursue an independent and peaceful foreign policy. This
policy in turn would tend toward a regional policy of
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maintaining stability and the existing balance in the Far
East . :
3 . Japan
Japan is unlikely to be a threat to the region in the
short or medium term although much speculation has occurred
concerning its long-term goals. For the time being, Japan
will continue to focus on economic strength and will tend to
approach a unified Korea as a potential market for its goods
as well as a chance for profitable investment. Any Japanese
fears over the potential for a unified Korea to be an economic
rival for Japan are minimized by the fact that Japan's GNP is
nearly twenty times that of South Korea' and the unification
process may be devastating to Seoul's economy.
There are also some circles in Japan who express
concern over the possibility of a unified Korea becoming
militarily belligerent and seeking revenge for Japan's
extended occupation of Korea. This feeling is prompted by the
fact that a reunified Korea today would possess a combined
armed force nearly six times larger than that of contemporary
Japan. Even after troop cuts, Korea is likely to retain an
armed force twice that of Japan's. 1 ' The value of this
figure is diminished, however, by the fact that the Japanese
government, spending only one percent of GNP on defense, could
far surpass Korean defense expenditures and amass huge amounts
of militarv armaments.
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On the other hand, it is just as unlikely for Korea to
be threatened by a revival of Japanese militarism. A deep
seated pacifism among the Japanese people makes a threat
through military forces even more unlikely for the short or
medium term. Were Japan to choose a path of belligerence
again it would seriously jeopardize its economic success.
Belligerency would cause Asian nations, and possibly Western
nations as well, to break off trade if they believed Japan was
returning to militaristic expansionism. Korea would mosc
likely not face that threat alone.
A greater indicator of a potentially peaceful
relationship between Korea and the other regional powers is
suggested by the lack of long-standing disagreements between
the governments in question. While many of the Korean and
Japanese people view each other With distaste, the governments
of both countries have no territorial disputes or other issues
that would be significant enough to cause outright war or even
a rupturing of diplomatic relations. The bilateral situations
between Korea and China, and Korea and Russia, are even
better. Additionally, all of the major regional powers have
strong pragmatic reasons for getting along with a unified
Korea, and there seems to be few serious disagreements that
would interfere with the development of such relations.
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B. REDEFINING THE US-KOREA RELATIONSHIP
The US-ROK mutual security treaty was forged in the Cold
War to allow the United States the option of defending South
Korea in the event of another North Korean attack. With the
unification of Korea, the prime question to be addressed is,
what will be the new role of the United States on the Korean
peninsula? The answer to this question will be based on the
stance the unified government takes in its approach to the
drastically changed security environment and the existence of
few immediate threats.
Because of Korea's unique geostrategic location, it must
formulate a policy that can be acceptable not only to the
two Korean regimes but also to the four external powers




In redefining the US-ROK security relationship, one option
that is available to US officials is that of total withdrawal
of US forces from the Korean peninsula. The proponents of
this course of action view US troop withdrawal not just as a
long term option but as a necessary step prior to unification.
Removal of the US "tripwire" would serve as a sign of good
faith to the DPRK government as well as allow the Uniced
States to be more judicious in choosing when and where to
intervene in a conflict. This view is further supported by
the increased economic and military capabilities of South
Korea as well as by the economic difficulties of the United
States. "As long as the United States is willing to promise
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direct intervention in the event of a war, the South has no
incentive to make the same degree of sacrifice for its
military that the North does." 12
While the US course of action will undoubtedly have some
effect on a unified Korea's redefining of a security
relationship, the unified Korean government would have its own
alternatives which may or may not include reliance on US
military forces. 13 There are four options that could be
considered the more probable alternatives for a unified Korean
government. The possibility exists for Korea to transition
through each of these options, to achieve a balance most
suitable to the peninsula and its unique conditions either as
a result of domestic politics or as a result of policy making.
Yet it is the unknown factors, such as a resurgent militarise
Japan, overthrow of the reform government in Moscow, or an
expansionist China, that may prompt a unified Korean
government to maintain some type of relationship with
Washington and reliance on the United States to help prevent
instability and war once a single Korea has emerged.
1. Exclusive Alliance
The first possibility to be considered does not assume
a fully independent Korea, but assumes Korea will maintain a
single sponsor for its security. Under this option, China,
Japan, or Russia would assume the same relationship with a
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unified Korea that the United States maintained with the ROK,
namely that of sole security partner.
For some Koreans, the idea of an alliance with China
appeals to certain ethnic feelings. Culturally China is
perhaps a better match for Korea than the United States, and
an alliance with an Asian nation seems more appropriate to
some Koreans than one with the United States. A partnership
with Japan is much less likely than with China, but should the
United States withdraw from the region, and Japan rearm
massively, a Korea-Japan alliance may be preferable to a
repeat of 1910. And while a partnership with Russia would be
the least likely, considering historical precedence and
Russia's internal problems, this might be preferable to being
absorbed by a more powerful Asian neighbor.
The most likely situation though, should a unified
Korea choose this scenario, is a continuation of an alliance
with the United States to guarantee its security. First and
foremos: are the relationships that have been established
since 1945. Second, while the United States has great
interests in the region, the location of the United States
places it outside the area of direct geographic involvement,
and is least likely to interfere in Korean domestic issues or
become an active threat to Korea. A broken US-Korea alliance
would no doubt leave hard feelings and few options for Korea
if China were to become a more expansionist regime. Finally,
the great powers of the region are in general agreement that
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US troops should remain in Korea as a force for regional
stability, even though that number could be cut back from
39,500 to as few as 10, 000. 14 In short, the United States




The next possibility would be for Korea to take a
collective security approach. This scenario assumes, if one
nation-state acts as an aggressor, then other nation-states
have a responsibility and duty to act against and, if need be,
punish the aggressor. :: The limitation of this approach is
that, for it to work, all nations involved must follow the
rules needed for the collective security system to prosper
and survive. It takes a clear definition of aggression and a
guarantee that the other members will act against such
aggression.-" The ambiguity of this approach indicates that
a multilateral collective security approach is not nearly as
effective as the existing bilateral ties that currently exist.
The idea of collective security, however, should not
be totally discounted but should be placed within the
framework of bilateral relations in the regional alignments.
Bilateral commitments, particularly the US-Japan and US-Korea
axes, would be easier to justify to the American taxpayer if
considered as part of a multilateral, regional stability
framework. This approach would entail more burden- sharing by
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US allies in the context of regional stability and would help
to justify US defense expenditures in the region, albeit on a
reduced basis. This arrangement would also provide a forum
where regional members could air grievances and resolve
disputes in a nonviolent manner. "Collective security will
not be a substitute for bilateral agreements, but it will
become an increasingly important complement to them." ;
3. Korean Neutrality
The concept of neutrality has been proposed by In Kwan
Hwang as a pre-unif ication approach aimed at reducing tension,
contributing to the unification process. •" In the current
context, however, political neutrality could be adopted as a
national policy along the lines of those successfully adopted
by Switzerland and Austria. Under this neutrality concept,
Korea would remain nonaligned with other powers and neutral in
major power disputes. While a portion of the existing
military would be converted to a militia (homeland reserve)
while maintaining a small, tough core of an armed force,
Korea's neutrality would be generally considered an unarmed
neutrality. Under this approach a reunified Korea would not
be considered a threat to Asia in the way that Germany is
often perceived of being to Europe. Ironically, a policy of
neutrality would allow a unified Korea to play the large
powers off one another much as the DPRK did with China and the
Soviet Union.
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However, the concept of neutrality takes on new
meaning in the post-Cold War era because the strict bipolar
alignments that once existed are no more. Any potential, new
threats that may occur down the road inevitably come back to
the geostrategic role of Korea among the big powers.
Neutrality would leave Korea in the path of an aggressor with
a national policy that precludes reliance on an established
alliance. Bargaining for an alliance at that hypothetical
point would place Korea in a weak position v/hich could
ultimately lead to greater conflict in the region. Korea
would once again be in a position of bystander as it was
during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars of the late
19th and early 20th centuries only this time capable of
creating its own devastation with its mass of modern
firepower. With this scenario in mind, most Koreans would be
uncomfortable rejecting the security relationship with the
United States in favor of a mostly disarmed neutrality.
4. Independent Nationalism
The final option in our consideration of options would
be for Korea to adopt a position of independent nationalism or
armed neutrality. Under this option Korea would adopt a form
of neutrality but it would be one of armed neutrality ,
eschewing security relationships to embrace a position of
nationalistic self-reliance. The seeds for this adoption of
this approach were sown under South Korea's first (1971-75)
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and second (1976-81) five-year Force Improvement Plans (FIP)
.
In 1971, the United States financed as much as $1.5 billion as
compensation for ROK military cooperation during the Vietnam
War. By 1975, the level of the ROK's self-reliance was
confirmed by the ceasing of US grant aid. President Park's
ambition to achieve "self-reliant national defense" was
assisted by $6.5 billion in military and $5.6 billion in
military aid from 1976 to 1981. By 1981, the foundation of
the independent South Korean arms industry was substantially
completed. 19
The adoption of independent nationalism as government
policy would see a continuation, and acceleration, of force
improvement projects. However, the keystone for a unified
Korea under this option might be for Korea to capitalize on
the combined North and South nuclear technologies to amass a
significant nuclear arsenal. 20 While the appeal to
nationalist, far-right wing groups is obvious, presentation of
this option posed as armed neutrality could persuade a large
portion of the Korean population to overlook the inherent
risks and limitations of this option and prevent alienation of
the greater majority.
C. US REGIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS
On 2 August 1990, President George Bush unveiled his new
national security strategy for the United States. The
rationale for this new strategy was based on the political
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changes in the world and led to the further development of the
specific national interests and selected objectives for the
United States:
1. The survival of the United States as a free and
independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and
its institutions and people secure.
2 . A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity
for individual prosperity and resources for national
endeavors at home and abroad.
3. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous
relations with allies and friendly nations.
4. A stable and secure world, where political and
economic freedom, human rights, and democratic
institutions flourish.-"'
For many Americans, the state of the US economy has become
the priority concern. The dissipating threat from the former
Soviet Union has made it difficult to justify maintaining the
large armed forces built up during the 1980s. Consequently,
many look for a reduction in those forces and redistributing
the money from this "peace dividend" to take care of economic
problems at home. Projections by US experts indicate that US
defense spending will decline below the 3.6% of GNP called for
by FY1995, and could be as low as 1% of GNP by the year 2000,
a low not seen since the defense budgets of the 1920s."'
Barring a period of rapid growth in the US GNP, a defense
budget of 1% of GNP would entail a drastically reduced
military with little capability to assist in maintaining




This trend toward a smaller defense budget means US forces
in the Pacific, as well as the Atlantic, would not only be
reduced but also restructured. The reduced forces in the
Pacific and Atlantic components would be supplemented with a
contingency response force when the local situation
requires.- This new strategy "accentuates the value of
mobile, flexible forces that move about and are not dependent
on bases . " - 4
While some Americans would argue for adopting an
"isolationist" stance and removing US forces from foreign
soil, 25 policy-makers are aware of the importance of
Northeast Asia to US trade. While much media attention
focuses on the economic success of Asian nations, the fact
that US-Pacific trade exceeds US-Atlantic trade by 50% is
often overlooked.-" This situation is aggravated by the
difficulty the United States has had in shifting the role from
teacher to student in economic issues.
The role of the US military in Northeast Asia will be
affected by the extent to which these countries adhere to the
principles of free-trade as proposed by the United States.
The United States has put pressure on these nations to move
toward market liberalization and to observe more closely the
tenets of free-trade. However, continued pressure by the
United States on trade issues could adversely affect other
relationships as well:
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The United States officially supports the notion of
unification, but not at the cost of allowing Korea to
maintain market barriers to United States goods and
businesses or allowing cheap Korean products to flood US
markets . ~
President Bill Clinton has declared that he will "focus
like a laser beam on the economy, and foreign policy will come
into play in part as it affects the economy."-' While some
Asian nations may interpret this statement as a less than
whole-hearted commitment to the region, his attitude toward
Korea remains relatively conservative. This is reflected in
his pledge that US troops would remain in Korea as long as
North Korea continues to be a threat. This pledge, while
indicating an effort to maintain continuity with the policies
of previous administrations, could also be construed as an
attempt to avoid one of former-President Carter's biggest
foreign policy mistakes of calling for a rapid withdrawal of
forces in Korea. 2q
The unification of Korea will add a new dimension to the
discussion of economic relations. The ROK has been more
receptive to US pressure than Japan, and as Korea comes to
terms with the economic costs incurred through the unification
process and takes optimal advantage of the combined resources
of a unified country this receptivity could be of benefit to
the United States. For the United States, continued support
and assistance will contribute to the stability necessary for
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Korea to forge ahead, furthering the potential for US trade
and adding to stability in the region.
Another important role for the United States in its
relations with Korea and Japan will be to serve as a mediator
to discourage military competition between the two. The
regional military commitment of the United States has been
important in deterring Japan from pursuing a military course,
and would be equally important in persuading Korea to reduce
its armed forces to levels not considered provocative in the
region. A continued commitment by the United States, in
conjunction with the UN or regional coalitions, could dissuade
both countries from feeling the necessity to pursue an arms
buildup
.
Finally, the various reforms being pursued in both Russia
and China will be aided primarily by the United States,
politically if not economically. To prevent a fear of renewed
aggression toward Asian allies of the United States, the
United States would benefit by continuing to extend its
nuclear umbrella over Japan and a unified Korea. In this way,
the tendency for nuclear proliferation would be kept at bay
and some degree of leverage would be maintained by the United
States .
US interests in the Western Pacific, Southeast Asia, and
the Indian Ocean, will probably continue to require a military
commitment. The importance of the region to the US economy,
as well as possible future strategic reasons, necessitates an
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American role in maintaining stability and a US presence in
the region. A unified Korea will create a new environment for
the United States. The benefits or detriments of this
environment to US interests could well be determined by the
presence of US forces serving as a stabilizing influence in
this economically important area. 30
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VII. CONCLUSION
The reunification of the Korean peninsula remains an
important priority for all Koreans. Despite the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the subsequent transformation of global
politics, the Korean peninsula remains an area where Cold War-
style attitudes still prevail. This situation continues
because North Korea continues to adhere to its delusive policy
of chuch'e and antagonism toward the South. The changing
relationships of the regional powers have created a new
environment of freedom and cooperation that will further
isolate the North if it continues to follow its chosen path.
A look back at Korea's reunification attempts reflects the
ebb and flow of international and domestic factors upon the
process. Each country has sought unification on its own terms
and, since each side's approach has been totally unacceptable
to the other side, used the unification issue as a means for
dispensing propaganda. For the South this process has been
made even more difficult by its own economic success and its
attempts at molding a more democratic government.
There is no external country or individual that can
coordinate the unification policies of North and South Korea.
The reunification of Korea is an issue to be resolved by the
Korean people. Yet, the international community can play an
important role in reducing tensions and encouraging the
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North's participation in diplomatic and economic initiatives.
Improved world relations have shifted attention away from the
Cold War implications of the reunification issue and created
a nev; environment within which to address the question.
Two points should be stressed in addressing the Korea
issue. First, the United States should maintain flexibility
and adaptability in its security relations with Korea. Steps
should be adopted to give the Korean government more
operational control of their own forces, to promote military
self-reliance in South Korea, and to directly address the
perceived causes of anti-Americanism that persist in the
South. Such steps as these should be adopted before
unification and continue during and after the process. This
would not only facilitate reunification but would help to
prevent the deterioration of the existing relationship.
Second, the United States should continue to pursue
initiatives toward establishing better relations with North
Korea. The role the United States plays vis-a-vis a unified
Korea will be influenced by the extent to which the United
States assists in the unification process.
The post-Cold War era will continue to see a shift from a
primarily bipolar international system to one that is more
multipolar, militarily, economically and politically . For the
rest of the 1990s and into the 2000s, alliances in Northeast
Asia will continue to be reappraised as security interests are
being reassessed. As the balance of power is increasingly
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determined by economic issues as well as by military ones,
China, Russia, Japan and the United States will all reevaluate
their current role in the region. Economics and politics
probably will overshadow military concerns for the top
attention of policymakers.
In this new environment, and with the unification of
Korea, security ties between the United States and Korea may
be as important as ever. The United States' willingness to
make such commitments is the result of continued reevaluation
of US security needs and objectives in the Western Pacific.
President Clinton has pledged to continue such commitments as
long as regional stability is threatened. A unified Korea
will continue to maintain its geostrategic importance while
the United States could serve to help reduce hostilities,
prevent a regional arms race, and pursue better interregional
security arrangements. A stable Korean peninsula will be
necessary for regional peace, and US commitments to the region
can help determine the success of such an outcome. It is
important for American leaders to reassess the importance of
Korea in an evolving situation and make decisions about the US
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